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ABSTRACT 
Recipient Allocation Preferences and Organizational Choices: 
 
A Fit Perspective. (December 2005) 
 
Celile Itir Gogus, B.S., Bilkent University; 
 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Adrienne J. Colella
 Dr. Christopher O. L. H. Porter 
 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand how individuals’ preferences for 
resource allocation affect their attitudinal and behavioral responses towards the 
organization. Building on the three main allocation norms (equity norm, equality norm 
and need norm) and taking the perspective of the recipient of an allocation, a model that 
predicts the antecedents of norm preference and consequences of using different 
allocation norms by the organization is presented and tested with a sample of Turkish 
registered nurses. Results show that recipients have differential preferences for 
allocation norms depending on resource type being allocated and characteristics of the 
environment. Furthermore, the fit or misfit between recipients’ preferred allocation norm 
and the allocation norm used by the organization affects recipients’ justice perceptions 
about the organization, their outcome satisfaction and performance.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Outcome allocation is one of the most frequently conducted activities in 
organizations (e.g., Deutsch, 1985). Effective allocation processes are essential for the 
well-being of an organization as proper distributions are necessary for achieving 
organizational goals such as high levels of performance and maintenance of harmony 
within the work group (Leventhal, Kamza & Fry, 1980). Decision makers in 
organizations may choose to follow various norms or rules when allocating outcomes 
such as past performance, seniority, employee needs, allocating the outcome equally 
among all those involved, or making allocations randomly (Deutsch, 1975; Conlon, 
Porter & Parks, 2004). 
A decision-maker’s choice of an allocation norm is important not only because 
distributions have important individual and collective consequences (Leventhal, 1980), 
but also because the manner in which an allocation is made will be a major determinant 
of fairness perceptions (Parks et al., 1999; Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004). Fairness 
perceptions have been linked to various important organizational outcomes such as 
satisfaction, trust, organizational commitment and withdrawal (Colquitt et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, Deutsch (1975) defined justice as being intrinsically concerned with both 
individual well-being and societal functioning. Thus, choice of an allocation norm has 
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significant consequences as it may affect an employee’s judgments of fairness and 
consequently important organizational attitudes and behavior.  
Decisions makers base allocations on the equity rule (where outcomes are 
allocated based on recipients’ inputs), the equality rule (where outcomes are allocated 
equally among recipients) or the need rule (where outcomes are allocated based on a 
needs principle) (Deutsch, 1975). Leventhal’s (1976a; 1980) justice judgment model 
also specifies three justice rules individuals may choose to use when deciding on 
recipients’ deservingness. Although conceptually identical with Deutsch’s rules, these 
rules in Leventhal’s model are called the contributions rule, the needs rule, and the 
equality rule. 
Even though Deutsch and Leventhal identified these different distributive 
principles almost two decades ago, research on these different distributive principles and 
their antecedents or outcomes have not progressed significantly (Tornblom, 1992). To 
the contrary, research on allocation rules, so far, has disproportionately and almost 
entirely focused on the equity rule (and mainly on equity theory as proposed by Adams, 
1963) (e.g., Deutsch, 1975). Although equity theory answers some very important 
questions and contributes significantly to our understanding of distributive justice 
concerns in the workplace, it nevertheless presents a unidimensional definition of justice 
by disproportionately focusing on the equity rule and ignoring other rules that may be 
employed in resource allocation decisions (Leventhal, 1976b). Furthermore, as stated by 
both Kabanoff (1991) and Chen and Church (1993), organizations are not simply equity-
oriented systems but use equality and need rules in addition to the equity rule to achieve 
two different and at times contradictory organizational goals: task performance and 
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social cohesiveness. Another major shortcoming of the research on allocation norms is 
that it focuses extensively on the allocation preferences of allocators (i.e., decision 
makers) and ignores recipients’ preferences (i.e., those who are impacted by the 
allocation). Even those few studies that examined recipient preferences used designs 
where the recipient was also an allocator, a situation that does not reflect the allocation 
situations in traditional organizations where a decision maker (usually a supervisor) 
makes the allocation decision without any input from the subordinates.  
The proposed research in this dissertation precisely aims to fill this gap in the 
organizational justice literature. By acknowledging tat there are a number of different 
distributive norms that may be used and affect a recipient’s perceptions of fairness, the 
proposed research tries to answer some important questions regarding both the 
antecedents and consequences of these different norms. This dissertation will contribute 
to the existing literature on allocation norms and organizational justice by examining 
different allocation norms, their antecedents and their consequences by testing a model 
of the antecedents for a recipient’s preference for a specific distribution norm as well as 
the effects of the fit between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the allocation 
norm used by the organization. 
The focus of this proposal will be the three main allocation norms discussed 
above: equity, equality, and need. Despite the fact that there are numerous norms or rules 
that may be followed when allocating outcomes, most of them seem to derive from these 
three basic rules. Furthermore, as the following chapter reveals, the existing literature on 
allocation norms and rules still has many important questions unanswered and a 
thorough investigation of these three allocation norms is warranted. 
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Individuals have a tendency to adopt different kinds of distribution rules and 
interpersonal orientations that are congruent with these rules under different kinds of 
interdependence (Kabanoff, 1991). For instance, most individuals tend to prefer the 
equality rule when they want to maintain good relationships in a non-competitive 
situation but prefer the equity rule when they want to maximize productivity in a 
competitive environment (Deutsch, 1975). The first part of this dissertation will build on 
this tendency to examine the antecedents of a recipient’s preferences for a specific 
distribution rule. The second part will examine the interplay among the recipient’s 
preferred distribution rule and the actual rule used by the organizations. To give an 
example, when a recipient prefers the equality rule for monetary outcomes and the 
organization uses the equity rule, this misfit between the preferred and actual allocation 
norms may create feelings of resentment and dissatisfaction in the recipient affecting 
satisfaction and perceptions of fairness. Thus, the two main research questions examined 
in this study are: 1) What are the antecedents to a preferred allocation norm (from the 
perspective of the affected party by the decision, i.e., the recipient of the outcome 
allocation) and 2) What are the effects of the fit or misfit between a recipient’s preferred 
and perceived allocation norm on outcomes such as outcome satisfaction, distributive 
justice perceptions and procedural justice perceptions? 
The proposed study contributes to the literature on allocation norms and 
organizational justice in at least three important ways. First, most of the studies in the 
literature take the perspective of the resource allocator. Although it is very important to 
understand how decision makers in organizations make their allocation choices, it is 
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equally important to understand what the recipients of these allocations would prefer. 
This study, thus, focuses on the perceptions and preferences of the allocation recipient.  
Second, this is the first comprehensive study that looks at both the antecedents 
and consequences of an allocation norm preference in a single model. Most, if not all, of 
the studies that have examined allocation norms have only focused on one or two 
antecedents or solely focused on the consequences of allocation norms. Tornblom (1992) 
stated that “the theoretical and pragmatic utility of future research would be enhanced by 
systematic and explicit attention to the question ‘What type of positive or negative 
consequences does the application of a given justice principle in the distribution of what 
kind of resource have for what, for whom, when, where, and from whose point of view?” 
(p. 200). The model proposed here aims to portray a full picture of the allocation rules in 
organizations and contribute to the literature by providing some of the answers to 
Tornblom’s question. 
Third, most of the research on allocation norms has been conducted in the 
laboratory. There are only a few field studies in the literature and even those field studies 
have used scenario designs that did not examine actual allocations and relied on 
participants’ assessments of hypothetical situations. This is a field study that examines 
the actual allocation preferences of recipients and the consequences of actual allocation 
decisions made by organizations. 
Overview of Dissertation  
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter II presents a review of the 
extant literature relevant to this study in distributive justice and allocation norms 
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literature. In Chapter III, the hypotheses and overall research model are presented. 
Chapter IV describes the data collection methods used in hypothesis testing. In 
Chapter V, the results of data analysis are presented. Lastly, Chapter VI discusses the 
meaning and implications of the results, strengths and limitations of the study as well as 
practical implications and future research directions.
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review consists of three sections: The first section is a short 
description of the three allocation norms. The second section reviews several theoretical 
models of the three main allocation norms. The third section focuses on empirical 
studies that examine the determinants of allocation norms preferred and/or used by 
different parties (i.e., the allocator, co-recipient allocator and recipient) in an allocation. 
The fourth section reviews the empirical literature on the outcomes associated with using 
various allocation norms.  
Allocation Norms 
Literature on allocation norms originally derived from the distributive justice 
theory. Distributive justice is the perceived fairness of outcomes and has been linked to a 
wide variety of outcomes such as outcome satisfaction, job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment, trust, evaluation of authority and withdrawal behaviors (Colquitt et al., 
2001). The main theoretical framework behind distributive justice research is the equity 
framework. Equity theorists share the view that injustice is proportional and in a just 
distribution, outcomes would be allocated to individuals in proportion to their 
contributions leaving individuals who contribute more with proportionally more 
outcomes than individuals who contribute less (Deutsch, 1985).  
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Although most of the empirical research in the distributive justice literature 
focuses on equity, when allocating outcomes in organizations, the equity rule is not the 
only rule that may be followed. In fact, solely focusing on the equity rule in examining 
distributive justice presents a unidimensional definition of justice, which may be 
misleading as justice is a multidimensional construct (Colquitt et al., 2001) and there 
may be other distributive norms than just the equity norm that may affect an individual’s 
perceptions of fairness (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976a; 1980). In fact, theoretical 
discussions of distributive justice rules in early works (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal 1976a; 
1980, Rescher, 1966) all focused on three rules: equity, equality and need. 
Deutsch (1975) identified eleven values that have been associated with 
distributive justice. According to him, distributive justice has been conceptualized as 
treating people so that all receive outcome proportional to their (1) inputs, (2) ability, 
(3) efforts, (4) accomplishments, (5) according to the principle of reciprocity (equity); 
(6) as equals, (7) so that they have equal opportunity to compete without external 
favoritism or discrimination (equality); (8) according to their needs, (9) so that no one 
falls below a specified minimum, (10) according to the supply and demand of the market 
place, (11) according to the requirements of the common good (need). Building on these 
eleven values, Deutsch (1975) further contended that decisions makers in allocation 
situations may choose to adopt the equity (where outcomes are allocated based on 
recipients’ inputs; values 1,2,3,4 and 5), the equality (where outcomes are allocated 
equally among recipients; values 6, 7) or the need (where outcomes are allocated based 
on recipient needs; values 8, 9, 10, 11) rules.  
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Rescher (1966) acknowledged seven principles of distributive justice: equality, 
need, ability and/or achievement, effort, productivity, social utility, and supply and 
demand. The principle of equality proposes the treatment of all individuals as equals. 
Need principle states that treating people according to their needs yields justice. The 
principle of ability and/or achievement dictates to treat individuals according to their 
abilities. Effort principle suggests individuals should be treated based on their efforts and 
sacrifices they make on behalf of themselves or their group. The principle of 
productivity states that fairness is treating individuals according to their actual 
productive contribution to their group. The social utility principle suggests individuals 
should be treated according to the likelihood of advancing of the greater good of the 
collective. Lastly, the principle of supply and demand proposes that individuals should 
be treated according to the value of their “socially desired” contributions, evaluated not 
only on the basis of the face value of the contribution but also on the desirability or 
necessity of and the supply of the contribution.  
Leventhal (1976b) also examined an individual’s perceptions of distributive 
fairness and defined a justice rule as a belief that outcomes ought to be distributed in 
accordance with certain criteria. According to Leventhal’s justice judgment model, in 
order to decide on an individuals’ deservingness, three different rules may be used: the 
contributions rule, the needs rule, and the equality rule. The contributions rule is based 
on the premise that individuals with greater contributions should receive higher 
outcomes. The needs rule states that individuals’ outcomes should satisfy their legitimate 
needs and prevent suffering. Lastly, the equality rule states that individuals should obtain 
similar outcomes regardless of any differences in their contributions or needs.  
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Throughout this proposal, an allocation norm is a belief and/or a social rule 
which specifies criteria that define certain distributions of outcomes as fair and just 
(Leventhal, 1976a; 1976b). The equity norm refers to the allocation of resources where 
individuals with greater contributions to the organization receive higher outcomes. The 
equality norm refers to the allocation of resources where all the individuals receive the 
same outcomes, regardless of any differences. Lastly, the need norm refers to the 
allocation of resources where individuals with greater need receive higher outcomes. 
Table 1 summarizes the definitions of allocation norms found in the literature as well as 
the definition used in this study. 
 
TABLE 1 
Summary of Allocation Norms 
Author Equity Equality Need 
Deutsch (1975) Outcomes should be 
allocated based on 
recipients’ inputs. 
Outcomes should be 
allocated equally 
among recipients. 
Outcomes should be 
allocated based on 
recipient needs. 
Rescher (1966) Treatment of all 
individuals based on 
their abilities, effort 
and productivity. 
Treatment of all 
individuals as equals. 
Treatment of all 
individuals according 
to their needs. 
Leventhal 
(1976a) 
Individuals with 
greater contributions 
should receive higher 
outcomes. 
Individuals should 
obtain similar 
outcomes regardless 
of any differences in 
their contributions or 
needs. 
Individuals’ 
outcomes should 
satisfy their 
legitimate needs and 
prevent suffering. 
Current study Allocation of 
resources where 
individuals with 
greater contributions 
to the organization 
receive higher 
outcomes. 
Allocation of 
resources where all 
the individuals 
receive the same 
outcomes, regardless 
of any individual 
differences. 
Allocation of 
resources where 
individuals with 
greater need receive 
higher outcomes. 
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More recent research on allocation norms (other than those that focus solely on 
equity theory) tend to build on the three main norms and their various conceptualizations 
identified by Deutsch (1975). For instance, Parks et al. (1996) used the equality rule to 
examine the distribution of unexpected gains and losses among acquaintances and 
friends. There are also some other studies that used allocation norms other than those 
identified by Deutsch. For example, Parks et al. (1999) examined the preference of 
manager allocators for a self-interest rule (operationalized as repaying debt or creating 
indebtedness), in addition to the equity, equality, and need rules. Despite these few 
exceptions, however, it is safe to assume that most of the research on allocation norms 
has been built on the influential work of Deutsch. 
Theoretical Models of Allocation Norms 
Deutsch (1975), in a prescriptive model of distributive justice rules that may be 
used by allocators, stated that the primary goal of the cooperative relations is the key 
determinant of what rule will be the dominant principle in distributing outcomes by 
stating that “the typical consequences of a given type of social relation tend to elicit that 
relation” (p. 147). Building on the eleven conceptualizations of distributive justice 
mentioned above, Deutsch identified three main propositions which link these values 
with different environmental conditions: (1) In cooperative relations in which economic 
productivity is a primary goal, equity rather than equality or need will be the dominant 
principle of distributive justice; (2) In cooperative relations in which the fostering or 
maintenance of enjoyable social relations is the common goal, equality will be the 
dominant principle of distributive justice; (3) In cooperative relations in which the 
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fostering of personal development and personal welfare is the common goal, need will 
be the dominant principle of distributive justice.  
The justice judgment model (Leventhal, 1976a) states that distribution rules are 
applied selectively and the basic criteria for evaluating fairness might change with 
contextual factors. The relative weight given to each rule by the allocator varies with 
factors such as self-interest in the situation, conformity to other people’s beliefs and 
behaviors, and availability of reliable information. Furthermore, when allocators 
estimate a recipient’s deservingness based on contributions, they consider 1) social 
comparison of the recipient with other receivers and with self, 2) recipient’s role in the 
situation, 3) task difficulty, 4) recipient’s ability, and 5) the allocator’s personal 
characteristics such as personality and demographics. When estimating a recipient’s 
deservingness by needs factors that affect an allocator’s decision are the legitimacy and 
the origin of the need. When estimating a recipient’s deservingness by equality, 
however, the allocator does not engage in a comparison process among the recipients as 
each one receives an equal share. 
Leventhal (1976a) also discussed different situations where an allocator may 
choose one justice rule over another. He stated that the contributions (equity) rule is 
more likely to be given a higher weight in situations where performing effectively is the 
primary responsibility of a receiver. The need rule, on the other hand, is more likely to 
be given a higher weight in situations where there is a close, friendly relationship 
between the allocator and the receiver. And lastly, the equality rule is more likely to be 
given a higher weight in situations where maintenance of harmony and solidarity among 
receivers is essential. 
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Leventhal (1980) presented a revised and expanded form of the justice judgment 
model. Here, a justice rule was defined as an individual’s belief that a distribution of 
outcomes, or procedure for distributing outcomes, is fair and appropriate when it 
satisfies certain criteria. Building on this definition, he defined a distribution rule as an 
individual’s belief that it is fair and appropriate when rewards, punishments, or resources 
are distributed in accordance with certain criteria. This expanded form of the justice 
judgment model presented a four-stage sequence by which an allocator evaluates the 
fairness of outcomes. The sequence begins when the allocator determines which 
distribution rules are relevant for the given situation and decides on their relative 
importance and weight. The second step is called preliminary estimation where the 
allocator estimates the amount and type of outcomes the receiver deserves based on each 
relevant rule determined in the first step. During the third step, which is called the rule 
combination step, the allocator combines the preliminary estimates from the second step 
with the weights determined in the first step in order to arrive at a final judgment of the 
receiver’s deservingness. In the fourth and final step of the sequence, the outcome 
evaluation stage, the allocator assesses what outcomes the receiver actually received and 
compares it to receiver’s deservingness. 
Leventhal, Kamza and Fry (1980) presented a model of allocation behavior (both 
for allocators and recipients) that combines the effects of the social structure and 
individual level psychological processes. They discuss three kinds of allocation 
preferences: performance matching distributions, equal distributions, and needs-
matching distributions. Performance-matching distributions would be preferred (by both 
the allocators and recipients) when maximizing productivity is the main goal. Equal 
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distributions would be preferred (by both the allocators and recipients) when the goal is 
to preserve harmony. Lastly, needs-matching distributions would be preferred (by both 
the allocators and recipients) when the main goal is the well-being of individuals, when 
individual needs are closely linked to group success, or when there is a desire to prevent 
waste and conserve valuable and rather scarce resources. 
Leventhal, Kamza and Fry (1980) also presented a theory of allocation 
preferences (both for allocators and recipients) which predicts choice of a distribution 
principle in a specific allocation situation. The theory is based on an expectancy model 
of motivation where preference for an allocation norm is predicted by the expectancy 
that a given distribution will lead to the attainment of a given goal (i.e., expectancy) and 
the relative importance of the given goal (i.e., instrumentality). According to the model, 
an allocator and/or recipient may have multiple goals at a given time and may assign 
different importance levels to each goal. Furthermore, because more than one 
distribution rule may be relevant for a given goal, the allocator and/or recipient ranks 
them in a preference hierarchy.  
Determinants of Allocation Norms Preferred and/or Used by Parties 
in an Allocation 
The literature on the antecedents of different allocation norms has focused on 
many variables. This review presents this research under three main categories: 
characteristics of the environment, type of outcome allocated and individual’s 
differences of the parties engaged in allocations.
 15 
 
 
Characteristics of the Environment 
Leung and Park (1986) showed that outsiders evaluating an allocation situation 
perceived the equity rule as more fair in a competitive social relationship and the 
equality rule as fairer in a cooperative social relationship. This work was based on 
Deutsch’s (1975) propositions regarding the effects of goals of the social relationships 
on which allocation norms will be dominant in a given situation. The same authors also 
found that these effects held true for different evaluators coming from different 
countries. Deutsch (1985) reported several laboratory studies which also reported similar 
results. Likewise, Chen (1995) showed that the more humanistic an allocator’s goal 
orientation (i.e., the extent to which the allocator perceived the organization as having 
humanistic as opposed to economical goals) was, the more she or he found the equality 
norm as more appropriate in allocation of resources. 
Several empirical studies have examined the characteristics of the social 
relationship on the allocator’s choice of an allocation norm. These studies 
conceptualized social relationships different than the competitive-cooperative taxonomy 
offered by Deutsch. Some researchers, for instance, operationalized the characteristics of 
the social relationship as whether the participants working on a common task were 
strangers or friends (e.g., Austin, 1980; Lamm & Schwinger, 1983; Morgan & Sawyer, 
1979; Sondak, Neale & Pinkley, 1999). The general finding among these studies was 
that strangers preferred the equity norm and friends preferred the equality norm as an 
allocation choice. Tornblom (1992), however, gave examples of situations where friends 
acting as allocators may prefer equitable allocations (for instance when there is unequal 
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effort involved) and concluded that the empirical evidence on this issue was 
inconclusive (p. 211).  
Other studies looked at the relationship between expectations of future 
interaction and choice of an allocation norm (Sagan, Pondel & Wittig, 1981; Shapiro, 
1975). These studies suggested that when participants (acting as allocators) expected 
future interaction with the other participants, they preferred the equality norm to allocate 
the rewards. When there were no expectations of future interaction, the equity norm was 
preferred. 
Another group of studies examined the input levels of recipients in an allocation 
situation as a determinant of allocation norm choices (e.g., Austin, 1980; Austin & 
McGinn, 1977; Kahn, Nelson & Gaeddert, 1980; Kahn, Nelson & Lamm, 1977; Leung 
& Park, 1986; Marin, 1981; Messick & Sentis, 1979; Shapiro, 1975; Sondak, Neale & 
Pinkley, 1999). For recipients, Messick and Sentis (1979) showed an egocentric bias 
where participants in the low input condition preferred the equality rule as fairer. 
Sondak, Neale and Pinkley. (1999) found the same effects where both strangers and 
roommates in the low input condition preferred the equality norm. In the high input 
condition, strangers preferred the equity rule and roommates preferred the equality rule. 
The same results were also obtained for allocators who were also recipients. It is 
important to note, however, that in a review of the literature on the equity and equality 
rules, Bierhoff, Buck and Klein (1986) questioned these findings by stating that the 
experimental manipulations through which these results were obtained may have 
sensitized the participants to individual performance levels and a may have resulted in a 
preference for the equity norm. 
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Based on these different studies, it can be concluded that the characteristics of 
the environment has some influence on which norm parties in an allocation situation 
perceive as appropriate. 
Type of Outcome 
Empirical research that examined the relationship between different outcome 
types and choice of an allocation preference almost exclusively focused on the outcome 
categories proposed by the social exchange theory (Foa & Foa, 1975). The theory 
identifies six outcome categories that may be exchanged in allocation situations: love 
(any expression of affectionate regard, warmth or comfort); status (evaluative judgments 
that express prestige, regard or esteem); information (advice, opinions, instruction, or 
enlightenment); money (anything that has some standard unit of exchange value); goods 
(tangible products, objects and materials); services (activities that affect the body or 
belongings of a person) (please refer to Chapter III for a detailed discussion of these 
categories).  
These studies that looked at these different resource groups and allocation 
preference showed that the nature of the resource being allocated affected the 
preferences for different allocation norms both for the allocators and recipients alike 
(e.g., Allison, McQueen & Schafer, 1992; Chen, 1995; Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004; 
Foa & Stein, 1980; Giacobbe-Miller, Miller & Victorov, 1998; Martin & Harder, 1994; 
Parks et al., 1996; 1999; Tornblom & Foa, 1983; Tornblom, Jonsson & Foa, 1985). For 
instance, Martin and Harder (1994) showed that allocators considered the equity 
(performance norm) more appropriate for financial rewards and the equality norm for 
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socioemotional rewards. Likewise, Giacobbe-Miller. Miller and Victorov (1998) showed 
that recipients of an allocation perceived the allocation of monetary rewards by the 
equity norm as fairer than payment with the equality norm. A review of six different 
studies by Tornblom and Foa (1983) revealed that the equality rule was the most 
preferred rule by the allocators for love, goods and services and the equity rule was the 
most preferred rule for status. For information, allocators equally preferred the equality 
and need rules and for money they equally preferred the equity and equality rules. 
Despite establishing a link between outcome characteristics and allocation norm 
preferences, however, it is almost impossible to draw any other solid conclusions from 
previous research on this topic as it is very hard to compare the studies directly. For 
instance, some of the studies compared the equity and equality rules (e.g., Kahn, Nelson 
& Gaeddert, 1980) whereas some others compared all three norms (e.g., Parks et al., 
1999). Likewise, the frame of reference (whether the participant was an allocator, an 
allocator who also was a recipient or just a recipient) also differed among the studies. 
Parks et al. (1999) stated that although it was a strength of this literature to use various 
measures, allocation rules and resource categories it also presented a weakness making it 
very difficult to compare the results across studies.  
Individual Differences of Parties in an Allocation 
Individual difference variables have not been extensively investigated as 
antecedents of allocation norms. The two main categories that researchers have 
examined are sex of the allocators and/or recipients and their cultural orientation.
 19 
 
 
Sex 
A general finding with respect to sex is that men tend to prefer the equity norm 
and women prefer the equality norm (e.g., Sagan, Pondel & Wittig, 1981). There are, 
however, some studies that fail to show these effects (e.g., Kahn, Nelson & Lamm, 
1977). Austin and McGinn (1977) concluded that sex differences in third-party 
allocation situations depended on the expectation of future interaction. More 
specifically, they showed that in situations where there was an expectation of future 
interaction both males and female allocators preferred the same rules, when there was no 
expectation of future interaction, however, female allocators tended to prefer the equality 
rule and male allocators tended to prefer the equity rule. Major and Deaux (1982) 
reviewed the literature on the role of sex differences on allocation norms and found that 
whether the allocator is a co-recipient moderated this relationship such that sex 
differences were not significant when the allocator was not a co-recipient. When the 
allocator was a co-recipient of the allocation, women followed the equality norm and 
this effect was more significant when women’s inputs were greater than her partner’s 
inputs. Kahn, Nelson and Gaeddert (1980) suggested that differences in allocation rule 
preferences due to sex were most likely to occur in weak or ambiguous situations. 
Cultural Orientation 
The general expectation for cultural orientation is that individualistic cultures 
should prefer equity whereas collectivistic cultures should prefer equality. However, 
empirical findings do not always confirm these expectations. Parks et al. (1999), for 
instance, did not find any differences with respect to preference for an allocation norm 
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between individualistic and collectivistic allocators. Likewise, Chen (1995) found that 
Chinese managers (allocators) who are traditionally assumed to be high on collectivism 
were more economically oriented and more likely to use differential rules than US 
managers (allocators). 
Meindl (1989) investigated the effects of leadership style on allocation 
preferences and showed that managers (allocators) who had higher task orientation 
preferred the equity norm compared to the managers (allocators) who had lower task 
orientation. Being people oriented, on the other hand, did not yield any significant 
differences for allocation norm preference. When the managers were given the goal of 
being just, however, leadership style did not explain the preference for the allocation 
norm. 
Summary 
In general, these studies show that the characteristics of the environment affect 
allocation rule choices of allocators such that in competitive, performance oriented 
environments the equity norm is prevalent and in environments where good social 
relationships are important the equality norm is prevalent. Likewise, expectations of 
future interaction has an effect on allocator’s choice. When there is an expectation of 
future interaction the equality norm is preferred and when there is no expectation of 
future interaction the equity norm is preferred. Furthermore, inputs of a recipient also 
affect allocation decisions for both the recipients and allocators alike such that those 
individuals in the low input conditions prefer the equality norm as opposed to the equity 
norm preferred by those in the high input conditions. Type of resource being allocated 
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also affects the allocation norm choices of allocators. Given the different and complex 
nature of the studies, however, it is not clear what allocation norm allocators mostly 
prefer for what type of resource. Lastly, it is not possible to reach firm conclusions on 
the effects of individual differences of parties in an allocation situation as there are a 
limited number studies available and the results of those studies contradict each other. It 
is also important to note that only a very small subset (e.g., sex and collective 
orientation) of possible individual difference variables have been examined in the 
literature. 
Another striking conclusion from this review is the paucity of empirical studies 
that have examined the need norm. This may be due to limited application of a need 
based distribution norm in organizations (Mannix, 1994) or it may be because of the 
difficulties in terms of creating a strong need manipulation in the laboratory settings 
where most of the research has been conducted. Along the same lines Schwinger (1986) 
stated that “specific hypotheses about the use of the need principle in allocation 
situations were developed not by using a justice approach, but by referring to theory and 
research about helping behavior… the term need changed its meaning from a personal 
need to a description of a deficiency of material resources. In summary, it can be said 
that the need principle has been vaguely defined and conceptualized as a principle of 
economic exchange” (p. 214). 
Effects of Using Different Allocation Norms on Organizational Outcomes 
Research examining the effects of different allocation norms such as fairness 
perceptions is scarcer than research examining the determinants of these norms. This 
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review will look at different categories of organizationally relevant outcomes that have 
been examined. 
Recipient Performance 
Very few studies in the literature have examined performance as a dependent 
variable. Deutsch (1985) summarized the results of six laboratory studies with 
undergraduate students that examined four different allocation norms (winner takes all, 
equity, equality and need) for allocating money. The results showed that allocation 
norms did not have an effect on productivity with the exception of tasks where 
performance depended on social cooperation. In the latter case, highest productivity was 
observed with equality norm. Another interesting finding from these six studies is that 
there was no relationship between fairness perceptions of different allocation norms (or 
working under a preferred allocation norm) and actual performance. Giacobbe-Miller, 
Miller and Victorov (1998) also failed to find a significant effect of allocation norms on 
performance. There are some other studies, however, that have reported increased 
performance under the equity norm (Tornblom, 1992). Meindl (1989), in a scenario 
study, found that managers perceived the equity norm to be positively related to 
productivity. Weinstein and Holzbach (1973) also showed that individuals were more 
productive under an equity based reward system compared to an equality based reward 
system. 
Another body of literature that is relevant to allocation norms and performance is 
the compensation literature. Pay plans such as individual incentives, merit-pay systems 
and profit-sharing plans are all application of the equity and equality norms in 
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compensation situations. Murray and Gerhart (1998), for instance, looked at the 
relationship between skill based pay and performance and showed that using skill based 
pay resulted in increased performance. Likewise, Harris, Gilbreath and Sunday (1998) 
found that performance ratings of employees correlated with merit pay systems. Bloom 
(1999) showed that more compressed pay dispersions (the array of compensation levels 
paid for differences in work responsibilities, human capital, or individual performance 
within an organization) were positively related to multiple measures of individual and 
organizational performance meaning that individuals performed better under pay 
systems that closely watched their differences with their coworkers. Lastly, in a meta-
analytical review of the literature between financial incentives and performance, Jenkins 
et al. (1998) showed that financial incentives were not related to performance quality but 
were related to performance quantity. Thus, although the studies done in the laboratory 
do not yield conclusive results, the compensation literature shows that there are positive 
effects of differential pay systems (i.e., application of the equity norm) on performance. 
Recipients’ Attitudes Towards the Task, Group Members, the Allocator and the Outcome 
Deutsch (1985) and Tornblom (1992) concluded that the equality norm resulted 
in more favorable perceptions of the task and more intrinsic motivation to perform well 
compared to other allocation norms. Deutsch (1985) also reported cooperative feelings 
among participants under equality and need norms and competitive feelings under equity 
norm. Meindl (1989) found that allocators perceived the use of equity norm to 
negatively affect solidarity and leader relationships. Leung and Park (1986) showed that 
recipients perceived an allocator who used the equity rule in a competitive situation and 
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an allocator who used the equality rule in a cooperative situation as higher on social 
competence. Sondak, Neale and Pinkley (1999), in a lab study where the participants had 
to reach an agreement on an allocation rule through negotiation, showed that strangers 
were more likely to use the equity rule and be satisfied with their outcomes than 
roommates (who were more likely to use the equality rule). These results are in line with 
the basic assumptions of Deutsch (1975) in that the dominant allocation preference 
should be the equity norm in competitive environments and the equality norm in 
cooperative environments. In other words, both allocators and recipients think that the 
appropriate allocation norm in a competitive situation is the equity norm and that the 
equality norm is appropriate in a cooperative environment. 
Kahn, Nelson and Lamm (1977) showed that the liking of an allocator depended 
on his or her generosity (i.e., maximizing other’s outcomes) such that recipients 
preferred an equitable allocator when the use of the equity norm maximized the 
outcomes of the group members and preferred an allocator who used the equality norm 
when the use of the equality norm maximized the outcomes of the group members. 
Given that this study used a scenario design (where the scenario was not based on an 
organizational context), it is not surprising to see that participants preferred an allocator 
that maximized group outcomes regardless of the allocation norm used. 
Fairness Perceptions 
Deutsch (1985) reported that participants strongly preferred the equity norm over 
the equality and the need norms and rated the equity norm as more fair (in competitive 
environments). Conlon, Porter and Parks (2004) assessed perceptions of fairness as a 
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function of resource type, allocation type, allocation rule (and different 
operationalizations of the equity, equality and need norms), and effect on the individual 
and found that equity norm, in particular operationalized as equity based on past 
performance, was seen as more fair than all the other allocation norms. For the equality 
norm, random draw operationalization resulted in higher fairness perception than chance 
meetings. For the need norm, business need was seen as more fair than personal need. 
The interaction of resource type and justice rule on fairness perceptions was not 
significant with the exceptions of random drawing where fairness perceptions were 
higher for resources that are classified as goods compared to resources that are classified 
as money or status.  
Giacobbe-Miller, Miller and Victorov (1998) and Marin (1981) also found that 
the equity norm was perceived as fairer than equality norm among managers and 
students acting as managers. Meindl (1989) found that managers (allocators) perceived 
that the equity norm positively affected fairness perceptions. 
Parks et al. (1996) examined the distribution of adventitious (i.e., unexpected) 
outcomes in a laboratory (non-organizational scenario) study and showed that 
individuals evaluated equality norm as the most fair allocation norm, even compared to 
keeping all the gain to themselves. Their results also showed that individuals rated their 
own actions as fairer than the same actions of others. Linkey and Alexander (1998) 
investigated the need norm in the setting of a Catholic Church and found that monetary 
allocations based on personal need was seen as fair. 
One overarching theme of the studies reviewed above is that the equity norm is 
perceived as the fairest allocation norm in organizational settings (i.e., competitive). 
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Equality norm is perceived as fair in non-organizational contexts (which usually are non-
competitive as well). Despite the scarce research on the need norm, it can be concluded 
that allocations based on business needs are perceived fairer than allocations based on 
personal needs. 
Summary 
As can be seen from the above review, the literature on consequences of different 
allocation norms is scarce and conclusions are underdeveloped. Although the above 
reviewed studies reveal that allocation norms affect various attitudinal and perceptual 
outcomes in organizations, at this point, there are still important questions that are 
unanswered. 
Limitations of Extant Literature  
Based on this literature review, there are several issues that call for attention. 
First, despite the several studies in the literature that look at the factors that lead to the 
choice or preference of an allocation norm, most of this research is inconclusive. There 
are three main reasons for this inconclusiveness. First, the studies have different frame of 
references such that some of them take the perspective of the resource allocator, some of 
them focus on situations where the allocator is also a co-recipient and some take the 
perspective of the recipient in the allocation situation. This difference in the frame of 
reference renders it difficult to make comparisons across these studies.  
Second, the studies reported in this review all used different operationalizations 
of resource categories. For instance, some studies operationalized monetary rewards as 
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bonuses (e.g., Chen, 1995) whereas some others operationalized both money and a 
camera as a monetary resource (e.g., Parks et al., 1996). Tornblom and Foa (1983) stated 
that different examples of the same resource category might affect the choice of 
allocation norm differently. Likewise, the studies differed in the extent to which they 
operationalized the allocation norms. In some studies, the need rule was operationalized 
as a personal need whereas in some others it was operationalized as a business need 
(e.g., Chen, 1995; Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004). Likewise, there are several 
operationalizations of the equity norm such as equity due to past, present and future 
contributions (e.g., Parks et al., 1999).  
The third main reason is the different designs of the studies in terms of 
participants, settings and experimental manipulations. For instance, some of the studies 
used laboratory studies where the participants engaged in the allocation tasks that were 
not organizationally relevant. Some of the studies used organizationally relevant 
scenario designs where the participant assumed the role of the allocator yet in some 
other studies the participants evaluated the allocator as an outsider. In addition to these, 
most of the laboratory research on the topic used dyads, leaving questions of 
generalizability of these results to larger organizational contexts. The few field studies 
that examined allocation norms used scenario designs. Thus, although there is a large 
body of empirical literature on allocation norms, it is problematic to compare the studies 
directly and draw solid conclusions. Furthermore, there is a lack of field research that 
looks at what actually happens in organizations rather than only examining what 
managers would do in hypothetical situations.  
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Most of the studies only looked at one or two variables that may affect allocation 
choices. Sondak, Neale and Pinkley (1999) concluded that “while the parties’ 
contributions, relationship, and needs relative to available resources must all be known 
in order to infer the goals of an allocator, most research to date has focused on one or at 
most two of these three contextual factors” (p. 491). Furthermore, the empirical literature 
on the need norm is very limited and does not delineate on all the factors it entails. 
Fourth, research on the consequences of different allocation norms is very scarce. 
The main dependent variable that has been examined is fairness perceptions but there are 
many other dependent variables such as outcome satisfaction, and different types of 
justice judgments that deserve further attention. Moreover, there is almost no research 
that examines what employees in an allocation prefer versus what the organization 
chooses to do and consequences this would have on employee attitudes and behavior.
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
The proposed model of recipient allocation preferences can be seen in Figure 1. 
Most of the extant research on allocation norms has focused on the allocation preference 
or actual allocation decisions of managers and/or executives (third parties) or individuals 
who were also the co-recipients of the allocation. The model proposed here, however, is 
about the preference of the recipient in an allocation situation who is affected by the 
allocation norm used but who does not have direct input to the actual allocation decision. 
In other words, the focus of the model is neither the allocator nor a third party observer 
to the allocation situation, but rather the individual who is directly impacted by the 
allocation and who does not have an input to or voice in the allocation decision.  
The first part of the model (Figure 1) depicts the proposed antecedents of a 
recipients’ preferred allocation norm. This first part of the model states that the 
characteristics of the outcome being allocated, the environment and the personality of 
the recipient are influential in predicting recipient’s preferred allocation norms. This 
perspective in modeling the antecedents to a recipient’s preferred allocation norm is also 
in line with the views expressed by several other researchers that claim that distributive 
values in a just world should depend on contextual factors (Baron & Cook, 1992; 
Bierhoff, Buck & Klein, 1986; Deutsch, 1975; Tornblom, 1992). The second part of the 
model (Figure 1) investigates the effects of the fit or misfit between a recipient’s 
preference for an allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization on 
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five outcome measures: distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice, 
outcome satisfaction and performance. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Model of Recipient Allocation Preferences 
 
 
 
 
Existing research on allocation norms have looked at various factors to 
understand the antecedents of allocation norms used by decision makers and 
consequences of using different allocation norms. The model proposed here is built on 
the review of the literature and tries to fill in the gaps that are left unanswered. Towards 
this end, the model includes variables that have been examined before and that are 
relevant for organizational settings in addition to some other variables that have not been 
examined before. For instance, there are several studies that have examined the role of 
acquaintance on the choice of an allocation norm. This factor, however, is not included 
in the model because in organizational settings all the employees, by definition, are 
acquaintances.  
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Antecedents to a Recipient’s Preferred Allocation Norm 
Following Leventhal (1976a, 1976b), an allocation norm is defined as a belief 
and/or a social rule which specifies criteria that define certain distributions of outcomes 
as fair and just. Recipient’s preference for a specific allocation norm is an attitudinal 
response to specific features of the allocation situation and disposes an individual to 
favor a certain distribution over others (Leventhal, Kamza & Fry, 1980). 
As noted in the second chapter, Deutsch (1975) identified three different 
distributive justice norms that can be used to allocate outcomes: equity, equality and 
need. Although there are other allocation norms that may be used in organizational 
settings (e.g., chance meetings, future performance expectations; see Conlon, Porter & 
Parks, 2004, for a more complete list), the three main norms identified by Deutsch will 
be the focus of this dissertation proposal not only because they apply to the majority of 
organizational settings but also because most of the other allocation norms fall under 
these three main rules (e.g., allocations based on seniority are actually allocations based 
on equity norm).  
Outcome Characteristics 
Outcome characteristics refer to the properties of the outcome that are being 
distributed. There are many outcomes that may be distributed in organizational settings 
such as salary, bonuses, status, organizational perks, accommodations, vacation time, 
and organizational resources such as computers. This list of outcomes is not exhaustive 
at all, and even this small list is sufficient to show the variety of outcomes that may be 
distributed in organizational settings. Existing research on resource allocation reveals 
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that different outcomes lead to different allocation norm choices; however, there are no 
solid conclusions on the specific type of resource and the allocation norm choice (Parks 
et al., 1999). 
Resource theory (Foa & Foa, 1975) which originally developed as a theory of 
social exchange is a useful and parsimonious way to categorize outcomes. According to 
the theory, anything that can be transmitted from one person to another in an 
interpersonal relationship is a “resource” and can be grouped into six basic categories: 
love, status, information, money, goods and services. “Love” includes any expression of 
affectionate regard, warmth or comfort and may be treated as friendship and/or 
affiliation in organizational settings (Parks et al., 1999). “Status” includes evaluative 
judgments that express prestige, regard or esteem. “Information” consists of advice, 
opinions, instruction, or enlightenment. “Money” is anything that has some standard unit 
of exchange value. “Goods” refers to tangible products, objects and materials. Lastly, 
“services” are activities that affect the body or belongings of a person (Foa & Foa, 
1975).  
Resource theory (Foa & Foa, 1975) classifies these six resources on two main 
dimensions: particularism and concreteness. Particularism refers to the degree to which 
the individuals and their relationships involved in the exchange affect the value of a 
resource. Resources that fall under love are considered to be highest on particularism as 
the allocator of this resource affects the value of the resource. For instance, the value of 
love received from a parent and a manager are completely different. Resources that fall 
under money are considered to be lowest on particularism as money has the same value 
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regardless of its allocator. According to the theory, service and status are less 
particularistic than love but more particularistic than goods and information. 
Concreteness refers to the form or type of expression characteristic of a resource 
and ranges form concrete to symbolic. In other words, concreteness of an outcome refers 
to its tangibility. Resource types of service and goods are considered high on 
concreteness whereas status and information are considered low on concreteness. Love 
and money are considered medium on concreteness (Foa & Foa, 1975).  
Foa and Foa (1975) also proposed some relationships between the resource 
classes and distribution rules. According to the authors, individuals would prefer an 
equality rule for the allocation of love, goods and services and an equity rule would be 
preferred for the allocation of status. Resources that fall under information would either 
be allocated based on an equality or a needs rule and monetary resources would be 
allocated based on an equity or a needs rule. 
Despite its parsimony and theoretical focus (Parks et al., 1999), empirical 
research on resource theory does not support Foa and Foa’s original predictions in 
organizational settings and remains inconclusive (Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004; Foa & 
Stein, 1980; Parks et al., 1999; Tornblom & Foa, 1983; Tornblom, Jonsson & Foa, 
1985). This inconclusiveness, however, is not surprising given that the theory originated 
as one of social exchange predicting allocation norms in social exchange situations. In 
other words, it is almost inevitable that some modifications need to be made to the 
theory to make it more appropriate for organizational settings.  
The main issue with the theory is the particularism and concreteness 
differentiation of the resource categories. Given the inconclusiveness of the empirical 
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research on these two dimensions, Parks et al. (1999) and Conlon, Porter and Parks. 
(2004) stated that there may be other underlying dimensions on which the resources 
identified by the theory differ.  
One possible underlying dimension of the outcome categories is whether they are 
given as a consequence of an individual’s contribution to the organization or if they will 
be used towards an individual’s contribution. Tornblom (1992) used a similar dichotomy 
with contributions. More specifically, he identified two facets of a contribution as the 
input and the outcome of the input. The input includes such factors as effort, education 
or ability. The outcome of the input includes performance outcomes such as quality and 
quantity of work. An outcome can also be classified along the same two dimensions. 
Some of the outcomes allocated in organizations serve as an input to an employee’s 
work (e.g., office space, computers, access to market data) and yet some other 
organizational outcomes are given to employees as a consequence of their work (e.g., 
stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, the latter category represents the “rewards” 
organizations allocate to their employees and the former one represents the “resources.” 
Combining this categorization with the outcome categories of resource theory, monetary 
and status outcomes can be considered as being allocated based on consequence of work 
and information, goods and services can be considered as inputs to work. 
Bierhoff, Buck and Klein (1986) state that using the equity principle is more 
appropriate when differences among individuals are stressed and when there is prior 
knowledge of individual performance. Outcomes that are allocated as a consequence of 
work or rewards, by definition, stresses the differences among individuals as each 
individual is differentiated by his or her own performance. Thus, it is expected that 
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recipients will have a preference for the equity norm for the outcomes that are allocated 
as a consequence of work and are seen as rewards.  
Hypothesis 1: For the allocation of outcomes that are perceived as a consequence 
of work (monetary and status outcomes), recipients will prefer the equity norm to 
the equality and the need norms.  
For organizational outcomes that are inputs to work (information, goods, 
services), it is expected that recipients will have a preference for an equality or a need 
norm. Bierhoff, Buck and Klein (1986) state that the equality principle is more 
appropriate when the equality of and similarity among individuals are emphasized. 
Recipients will have a preference for an equality norm for the allocation of these 
resources as they would like to be considered equal with their coworkers for the 
resources they would need to complete their work.  
Hypothesis 2: For the allocation of outcomes that are perceived as an input to 
work (information, services, goods, affiliation), recipients will prefer the equality 
norm to the equity and the need norms. 
One exception to previous two hypotheses, however, would be for resources that 
are perceived as scarce. Scarce outcomes can be defined as those outcomes that are 
limited and/or constrained. Because of their limited nature, not all the recipients can 
receive an equitable or an equal share of these resources. Leventhal, Kamza and Fry 
(1980) suggested that in situations where resources are constrained, the equity and the 
equality norms would be of less concern and the need norm would be perceived as more 
legitimate. Thus, I hypothesize that recipients will prefer the need norm for the 
allocation of resources that are perceived as scarce.  
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Hypothesis 3: Perceptions of scarcity of a resource will be positively related to 
recipients’ preference for the need norm to the equity and the equality norms. 
Environmental Characteristics 
Sondak, Neale and Pinkley (1999) recently stated that the meaning of preferences 
for distribution norms cannot be adequately understood without consideration of the 
context in which distribution decisions are made. Environment is an important factor that 
affects individual’s perceptions and preferences. Leventhal (1980) suggested that one of 
the factors that would affect the choice of an allocation rule is the surrounding social 
context. He further contended that the preference for a certain rule will depend on the 
extent to which that rule would help achieve goals of social relationships. Likewise, 
Deutsch (1975) proposed that the nature of the environment is the main determinant of 
an individual’s preference for a specific allocation norm. Baron and Cook (1992) 
suggested that context is especially important in explaining equity and justice issues in 
organizations. A study by Bierhoff, Buck and Klein (1986) empirically showed that 
situational cues are important for individuals when determining their preference for 
allocation rules. 
As indicated by the above comments, the characteristics of the environment in 
which the allocation is taking place are essential factors that determine a recipient’s 
preferred allocation norm. Here, I’ll focus on two characteristics that may influence an 
individual’s preferred allocation norm: goal priority and the level of resource 
dependency in the environment.  
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Deutsch (1975) contended that in cooperative relations where economic 
productivity is the main goal, equity would be the dominant principle, in relations where 
the fostering or maintenance of enjoyable social relations is the main goal, equality 
would be the dominant principle and in relations where fostering of personal 
development and personal welfare is the primary goal need would be the dominant 
principle in distributing outcomes by allocators.  
Goal priority (Chen, 1995) refers to an individual’s perceptions about an 
organization’s goals. An organization may have economic goals (e.g., quality, 
productivity), humanistic goals (e.g., employee satisfaction, warm atmosphere) or both. 
The goal priority argument rests on the idea that allocation norms are related to the 
collective goals of the system (Leventhal, Kamza & Fry, 1980) and the allocation 
preferences of individuals in an organization will match the goal priorities of the 
organization. Chen (1995) tested a model of goal priority with Chinese and US 
organizations and showed that goal priorities predicted allocation preferences such that 
employees (acting as allocators) working at economically oriented organizations 
preferred equity norms and those that work at humanistically oriented organizations 
preferred equality norms.  
Goal priority is one method of inferring about the characteristics of a social 
relationship. Given the ample evidence in the literature about the relationship between 
the characteristics of the social relationship and allocation norms used, goal priority is 
expected to affect the allocation preferences of recipients in an organization. Thus, 
combining the economic and humanistic goal orientations with the basic propositions of 
Deutsch (1975) raises the following two hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 4a: Perceptions of an economic goal priority will be positively related 
to recipients’ preference for the equity norm to the equality and the need norms. 
Hypothesis 4b: Perceptions of a humanistic goal priority will be positively related 
to recipients’ preference for the equality norm to the equity and the need norms. 
The level of resource dependency is the second environmental characteristic that 
is hypothesized to influence recipients’ preference for an allocation norm. Following 
Kabanoff (1991), resource dependency is defined as dependence on critical resources, 
i.e., one party (x) having power over another (y) to the extent that (y) depends on (x) for 
critical resources and/or outcomes for which there is no alternative supply. It is 
important to note that resource dependency of a party is not the equivalent of its 
resources or outcomes; resource dependency develops as a result of having control over 
critical resources and/or outcomes but may become institutionalized over time 
(Kabanoff, 1991, p. 422).  
Kabanoff (1991) stated that resource dependency in social relationships would be 
influential in how different parties, i.e., strong and weak in terms of their resource 
dependency, view their dependence, entitlements, and contributions and would be 
influential in shaping their distributive orientations. Bierhoff, Buck and Klein (1986) 
stated that the equity principle was more appropriate when differences among 
individuals were stressed and equality principle was more appropriate when the equality 
of and similarity among individuals were emphasized. Along the same lines, Kabanoff 
(1991) proposed that in contexts where resource dependency differentiation is high, 
there would be an unequal (differentiated) social interdependence and the dominant 
distributive orientation would be the equity rule. In contexts where resource dependency 
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differentiation is low, on the other hand, the social interdependence would be equal 
(undifferentiated) and the dominant distributive orientation would be equality.  
The results of studies conducted by Mannix (1993, 1994) revealed similar results 
to those proposed by Kabanoff (1991). She showed that allocation norm served as a 
moderator in the relationship between resource dependency and resource allocation in 
small group negotiation situations. More specifically less resource dependent parties 
received higher outcomes under the equity norm and lower outcomes under a need norm 
whereas high resource dependent parties received higher outcomes under the need norm 
and lower outcomes under the equity norm.  
Given that there are no published studies that test Kabanoff’s (1991) predictions 
in terms of a preference for an allocation norm, the following hypotheses which are 
originally offered by Kabanoff (1991) are proposed. 
Hypothesis 5: Resource dependency will be positively related to recipients’ 
preference for the equity norm to the equality and the need norms. 
Recipients’ Individual Difference Variables 
The last group of factors proposed to affect a recipient’s preferred allocation 
norm are personality and individual differences. Leventhal (1976b) expressed the 
importance of personality in assessing the fairness of a relationship. Tornblom (1992) 
stated that the research in allocation behavior had underscored the importance of 
personality and how it affected individual’s allocation preferences.  
In examining the effects of personality on allocation rule preferences, I will rely 
on the five-factor model of personality (Digman, 1989; 1990). “Big Five” personality 
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dimensions (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and 
openness to experience) have been shown to be sufficient to account for the underlying 
structural representation of an individual’s personality and to validly predict a variety of 
organizational outcomes (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Of the five dimensions, I will focus 
on agreeableness as this is the only dimension that is theoretically relevant in resource 
allocation situations. I choose to exclude the other four dimensions, as there is no 
theoretical basis for including those dimensions in this model.  
Agreeableness is the extent to which and individual is courteous, good-natured, 
flexible, trusting, cooperative, empathic, caring and tolerant (Barrick & Mount, 1991). 
Individuals high on agreeableness tend to get along with others around them and care 
about the well-being of others. The equality norm has been associated with maintaining 
harmony and fostering of enjoyable social relations. Thus, it is expected that recipients 
who are high on agreeableness will prefer an equality norm in allocation situations. 
Hypothesis 6: Agreeableness will be positively related to recipients’ preference 
for the equality norm to the equity and the need norms. 
Concern for others is a relatively stable other-oriented individual value that 
reflects an individual’s emphasis on being helpful and cooperative toward others. This 
orientation is unrelated to constructs included in most personality models and exhibits 
small correlations with personality dimensions (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004). 
Individuals who are high in concern for others place less emphasis on own personal 
outcomes and are less likely to engage in rational calculations (i.e., making choices 
based on the option that has the highest utility or expected utility) when making choices. 
Research on concern for others has shown that it may explain differences in a variety of 
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judgment and decision making contexts and a wide range of organizational processes 
which are unrelated to and beyond helping behavior (Korsgaard, Meglino & Lester, 
1997). 
Concern for others is an important individual difference variable that is likely to 
affect recipients’ allocation preferences. Given that individuals who are high on this 
value place less importance on their own personal outcomes, something that would be 
associated with a preference for an equity and/or equality norm, the following 
relationship between concern for others and the recipients’ preferred allocation norm is 
expected. 
Hypothesis 7: Concern for others will be positively related to recipients’ 
preference for the need norm to the equity and the equality norms. 
The cultural model as a determinant of allocation preferences states that cultural 
values and norms affect allocation preferences by predisposing individuals to favor 
certain allocation norms over others (Chen, 1995). Collectivism is one of the main 
dimensions of the cultural model. Collectivism is usually conceptualized as having a 
social orientation, whereas individualism is characterized by having a self-orientation 
(Hofstede, 1980). Allocentrism vs. idiocentrism is the individual level equivalent of 
collectivism vs. individualism (Triandis et al., 1988). Findings show that the 
allocentrism vs. idiocentrism reflect a multidimensional construct (Gelfand, Triandis & 
Chan, 1996). Previous research (e.g., Triandis et al., 1988) has shown that allocentrism 
was positively related to social support and low levels of alienation and idiocentrism was 
positively related to emphasis on achievement. Thus, it is expected that recipients who 
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are high on allocentrism to prefer the equality norms and recipients who are high on 
idiocentrism to prefer equity norms.  
Hypothesis 8a: Allocentrism will be positively related to recipients’ preference 
for the equality norm to the equity and the need norms. 
Hypothesis 8b: Idiocentrism will be positively related to recipients’ preference 
for the equity norm to the equality and the need norms. 
Self-efficacy refers to “beliefs in one’s capabilities to mobilize the motivation, 
cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to meet given situational demands” 
(Wood & Bandura, 1989, p. 408). Self-efficacy reflects differences among individuals in 
terms of their predispositions to view themselves as capable of meeting task expectations 
and has been linked to numerous outcomes such as training proficiency and job 
performance (Chen, Gully & Eden, 2001). Recipients who are high on this variable will 
feel confident about their abilities and feel that they can perform their roles 
satisfactorily. This, in turn, will lead to a preference for the equity norm as they will 
want to be differentiated based on their abilities and performance. Recipients who are 
low on self-efficacy, on the other hand, will not prefer to be differentiated from the 
group as they will doubt their abilities and performance. 
Hypothesis 9: Self-efficacy will be positively related to recipients’ preference for 
the equity norm to the equality and the need norms. 
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Consequences of Misfit Between Recipient’s Preferred 
and Actual Allocation Norms 
Tornblom (1992) stated that “The operation (as well as the evaluation and 
violation) of different justice principles may result in different (positive as well as 
negative) consequences for an individual’s satisfaction with his lot, a group’s 
effectiveness in performing a joint task, the socio-emotional climate among group 
members, the power and prestige order among group members, intergroup relations, etc” 
(p. 197). In allocation situations, recipients compare their preferred allocation norms to 
the norms used by the organization. The outcome of this evaluation, i.e., the fit or misfit 
between the preferred and perceived allocation norm, in turn, is expected to affect 
various organizational outcomes. The following discussion elaborates on this evaluation 
and identifies different attitudinal responses recipients may develop when they 
experience different kinds of fit and misfit between preferred and actual allocation 
norms. Meindl (1989) stated that when recipients of an allocation are the focus of 
investigation, their satisfaction levels, perceived fairness of the decision process and the 
outcome are important variables that need to be examined. Thus, the five dependent 
variables of this model are perceptions of distributive justice, procedural justice, 
interactional justice, outcome satisfaction and performance. 
Before discussing the fit between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the 
perceived allocation norm used by the organization, however, it may be useful to make a 
distinction between different types of justice judgments individuals make and especially 
between distributive and procedural justice. Leventhal, Kamza and Fry (1980) stated that 
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a distribution is a result and the procedures are the part of a causal network that 
generates that result. Thus, distributive justice refers to the fairness of outcome 
distributions or allocations and procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures 
that are used to make those outcome distributions or allocations (Adams, 1963; Colquitt 
et al., 2001; Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). In their meta-
analyses of the justice field, Colquitt and his colleagues (2001) tested for the 
independence of different types of justice and showed that distributive, procedural, 
interpersonal and informational justice are distinct constructs that underlie different 
dimensions of the justice phenomena.  
Despite the distinctness of the different dimensions of justice, however, the 
central thesis underlying the model presented here, following Brockner and Wiesenfeld 
(1996), is that the procedures that yield an allocation (i.e., allocation norms) cannot be 
examined in isolation from the outcome of the allocation itself. In other words, it is 
expected that recipients’ fairness perceptions about an allocation will be influenced by 
both the fit or misfit between preferred and perceived allocation norms and the outcome 
of the allocation itself. Referent cognitions theory (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger, 
1986, 1987), built on a would/should conceptualization, states that in outcome allocation 
situations “resentment is maximized when people believe they would have obtained 
better outcomes if the decision maker had used other procedures that should have been 
implemented” (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989, p. 293).Thus, the favorability of the 
outcome is expected to moderate the relationship between fit or misfit between preferred 
and perceived allocation norms and satisfaction and fairness perceptions.  
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Effects of Fit/Misfit 
When a recipient’s preferred allocation norm matches with the perceived 
allocation norm used by the organization, it is expected to result in outcome satisfaction 
and favorable perceptions of distributive, procedural and interactional fairness 
judgments as well as increased performance. In instances where an recipient’s preferred 
allocation norm matches the norm used by the organization, the recipient would not 
engage in the “would/should” comparison process identified by the referent cognitions 
theory as both the would and should norm would be the same. This, in turn, is expected 
to lead to favorable perceptions of the outcome as well as positive perceptions of 
distributive, procedural and interactional fairness and increased performance. This 
relationship is expected to hold true for both types of resources, inputs and outcomes. 
A misfit between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm 
used by the organization in a particular situation, on the other hand, is expected to result 
in negative perceptions of the outcome and the organization in general. According to the 
referent cognitions theory (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger, 1986, 1987), when there 
is a misfit between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the perceived allocation 
norm used by the organization, recipients will engage in the “would/should” comparison 
and compare the outcome they obtained with the perceived allocation norm to the 
outcome they would have obtained if their preferred allocation norm was used.  
Hypothesis 10: A misfit between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the 
perceived norm used by the organization will be negatively related to 
a) distributive justice, b) procedural justice, c) interactional justice, d) outcome 
satisfaction and e) performance. 
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Although a misfit is expected to lead to some dissatisfaction, however, this does 
not necessarily mean that recipients will feel total dissatisfaction over an outcome when 
the outcome is not distributed according to their preferred rule or that all the felt 
dissatisfaction will be similar in nature. Studies in the resource allocation literature (most 
of which allocated resources that can be classified as outcomes) have shown that 
allocations that used equity norms are seen as more fair than allocations based on other 
norms (e.g., Conlon, Porter & Parks, 2004). This tendency is more prevalent in 
organizational contexts where an individualistic orientation is especially salient. In 
organizational settings, societal norms hint to individuals that equity norms are more 
appropriate where competitiveness is part of the daily routine. This societal norms are 
especially more prevalent for the allocation of outcomes, as opposed to inputs, as 
outcomes are allocated as a consequence of one’s work. Thus, when the recipient has a 
preference for the equity norm and the perceived allocation norm is the equality or the 
need norm, the recipient will develop negative perceptions for the organization not only 
because his/her preferred norm is not used but also the “norm” of using equity in 
organizations has been violated. On the other hand, when the recipient has a preference 
for the equality or the need norm for the allocation of outcomes, but the organization 
uses the equity norm, the recipient may not develop as strong negative perceptions about 
the organization as the organization is following the “norm.” Thus, negative perceptions 
developed when there is violation of preferred equity norm will be stronger than when 
there is a violation of preferred equality and need norms. 
Hypothesis 11: A misfit between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the 
perceived norm used by the organization such that the recipient prefers the equity 
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norm and the perceived allocation norm is the equality or the need norm, will be 
more negatively related to a) distributive justice, b) procedural justice, 
c) interactional justice, d) outcome satisfaction and e) performance compared to 
other types of misfit. 
Moderating Role of Outcome Favorability 
Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996), in a review of the justice literature, found an 
interaction effect of distributive and procedural justice such that when procedural justice 
is relatively low, outcome favorability influences individuals reactions and when 
outcome favorability is relatively low, procedural justice has a direct effect on 
individuals reactions. These findings are also in line with Folger and Kass (2000) who 
stated that “it is certainly possible for fair procedures to produce unfair outcomes or 
unfair procedures to yield fair ones” (p. 431). Morgan and Sawyer (1979) concluded that 
allocation norms affect not only the decisions about the allocation but also the decisions 
about procedures used to arrive at the allocations. Brockner and Wiesenfeld’s results 
show the impact of outcome favorability on individual’s reactions and I expect outcome 
favorability to moderate the relationship between fit or the misfit between recipients’ 
preferred allocation norms and the norms used by the organization and satisfaction and 
fairness perceptions. I expect outcome favorability to increase the positive effects of a fit 
on the outcome variables and decrease the negative effects of a misfit. 
Hypothesis 12: Outcome favorability will moderate the relationship between the 
misfit between the recipient’s preferred and perceived allocation norm and the 
dependent variables: a)outcome satisfaction, b) distributive justice, 
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c) interactional justice, d) procedural justice and e) performance) such that 
outcomes that are more favorable will reduce the negative effects of the misfit on 
the dependent variables. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
Participants in this study were registered nurses (RNs) working at a university 
hospital in Turkey. The hospital has two main divisions, an adult hospital and a 
children’s hospital and the hospital administration endorsed the study and encouraged 
the RNs to complete the surveys. Participation in the study was voluntary and 
participants remained anonymous. 
A total of 700 RNs working at both hospitals received the initial survey. Of the 
700 first surveys distributed, 544 respondents completed the first survey, 454 
respondents completed the second surveys and 363 respondents completed the third 
survey. Matching the three surveys yielded 255 usable surveys, representing a 36% 
response rate. Of the usable responses, respondents had a mean age of 31.70 (s.d. = 7.83) 
and 98% were female. Mean tenure with the profession was 10.80 years (s.d. = 8.99) and 
mean tenure with this hospital was 9.97 years (s.d. = 8.77). 38.4 % of the respondents 
had a 2-year college degree, 54.5 % a 4-year college degree while 2.7% had graduate 
degrees. 13.8% of the respondents were in supervisory positions, 25.1% were clinic 
nurses (only worked the day shift) and 57.3% of the respondents worked on rotating 
shifts. 34.1% of the respondents were contract employees.  
One important and potentially problematic aspect of this sample in terms of its 
external validity was that it predominantly consisted of female participants (98% of the 
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participants were female). Although using a predominantly female sample may have 
created some problems because of previous findings in the justice literature that show 
some differences between male and female respondents, I do not believe that this created 
major problems. First, the composition of the sample was not because of any particular 
characteristic of the hospital but a characteristic of nursing practice in Turkey (to some 
extent even in U.S.). Second, and perhaps more importantly, Kahn, Nelson and Gaeddert 
(1980) suggested that sex differences in allocations situations are more likely to occur 
when situational demands are weak. Given that organizational contexts are strong 
situations (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989), the authors argue that sex differences in the 
past research have been exaggerated. Thus, considering the potential advantages of 
conducting a field study, I do not expect the sample’s nature to be a limitation for the 
study. 
Another important and potentially problematic aspect of this sample in terms of 
its external validity is that the all the sample consists of Turkish nationals. Most scholars 
(e.g., Cortina & Wasti, 2005; Goregenli, 1997) define Turkey as a country that rates 
higher on collectivism than it does on individualism. One may argue that because of this 
characteristic of the sample, the results obtained in this study would not be generalizable 
to a North American sample which is generally considered high on individualism and 
low on collectivism. First, the means and standard deviations obtained from the data 
show that the sample rates almost the same on idiocentrism (mean = 3.55, s.d. = .41) and 
allocentrism (mean = 3.72, s.d. = .34). Second, and more importantly, nursing, as a 
profession, has a very strong culture and professional norms that go beyond a national 
culture (e.g., Bottorff, 1991; Donaldson & Crowley, 1978; Watson, 1985). Thus, 
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although the sample consists of Turkish nationals, because these individuals are all in the 
nursing profession, these strong norms and professional culture would overshadow any 
effects national culture would have on their reactions.  
Translation 
All the survey instruments were translated into Turkish using the back translation 
method (Brislin, 1970) where two individuals independently conducted the translations. 
One translator (who is familiar with the literature) translated the English scales into 
Turkish. This version was back-translated by a bilingual translator into English. 
Procedure 
Participants answered three questionnaires at three different times (1 week apart 
from each other). At Time 1, participants answered questions regarding the individual 
difference variables and environmental characteristics. At Time 2, participants answered 
questions regarding their preferred allocation norms. At Time 3, participants answered 
questions regarding the allocation norms used by the organization and the dependent 
variables. All the responses were strictly confidential and at no time during the study 
were participants asked to identify themselves with their names or any other personally 
identifiable information. The three surveys were matched through a coding system only 
the respondents knew. 
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Measures 
Control Variables 
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their sex, age, education level, 
tenure with the hospital, tenure in the profession, and organizational rank (items 91-104 
in Appendix A). 
Independent Variables 
Agreeableness. Agreeableness was measured using the shortened version of the 
Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-S). This scale had 12 items (e.g., “I try to 
be courteous to everyone I meet” and “I would rather cooperate with others than 
compete with them”) and used a 5-point Likert scale. Cronbach’s alpha for this item was 
59 (items 1-11 in Appendix A). 
Concern for others. Concern for others was measured by the Concern for Others 
subscale of the Comparative Emphasis Scale (CES) (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987). This 
subscale consisted of 6 items. Sample items included “Correcting others’ errors without 
embarrassing them” and “Lending a helping hand to someone having difficulty.” 
Cronbach’s alpha for this item was .94 (items 67-78 in Appendix A).  
Self-efficacy. Self-efficacy was measured by the 10-item self-efficacy scale 
developed by Bandura (1991). The participants indicated the extent to which they agreed 
with items like “I am an expert at my role” and “When my performance is poor, it is due 
to my lack of ability” on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) response scale. 
Cronbach’s alpha for this item was .72 (items 12-22 in Appendix A). 
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Allocentrism-idiocentrism. Collectivistic and individualistic values were 
measured by using the INDCOL instruments proposed by Singelis et al. (1995). This 
scale has been used in Turkish context before and has been validated by Robert and 
Wasti (2002). The participants indicated their agreement with the statements on a 5-point 
scale (1-strongly disagree to 5- strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha was .74 for 
allocentrism and .74 for idiocentrism (items 23-59 in Appendix A). 
Resource type. The six resource types proposed by Foa and Foa (1975), status, 
information, money, goods, services, and affiliation were clustered into two main 
categories: resources that are given as an input to an employee’s work and resources that 
are given as a consequence of an employee’s work. Although this distinction was made 
on a theoretical basis (see the development of Hypotheses 1 and 2), respondents were 
also asked to classify the six resource types as an input to employee’s work or as a 
consequence of an employee’s work and the results of this classification are discussed in 
the results section (items 1-6 in Appendix B). 
Scarcity. Scarcity was measured with a one-item measure that asked respondents 
their perceptions about whether the inputs and outcomes at their organization were 
scarce on a 1 (very scarce) to 5 (very abundant) scale (item 11 for inputs and item 16 for 
outcomes in Appendix B). 
Goal priority. Goal priority was measured by the goal priority scale (Chen, 
1995). This scale is consistent with the productivity-solidarity categorization of system 
goals (Deutsch, 1985). The scale listed twelve goals (see appendix) and respondents 
were asked to indicate how much each goal is emphasized at their organization on a 
scale of 1 (to a very small extent) to 5 (to a very large extent). Cronbach’s alpha was .78 
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for economic goal priority and .97 for humanistic goal priority (items 79-90 in 
Appendix A). 
Resource dependency. Resource dependency was measured with a 4-item scale 
that is developed for this study by building on the definition of power proposed by 
Kabanoff (1991). Respondents indicated their agreement with the items on a 1 (strongly 
agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) Likert-type scale. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was.72 
(items 60-63 in Appendix A). 
Outcome favorability. Outcome favorability was measured with a three-item 
response scale adopted from Brockner et al. (2000) and Chen, Brockner and Greenberg 
(2003). Participants answered the scale twice for inputs and outcomes. A sample item is 
“How satisfied are you with your monetary outcomes?” Cronbach’s alpha was .92 for 
outcomes and .88 for inputs (items 6-8 for inputs and items 36-38 for outcomes in 
Appendix C). 
Dependent Variables 
The respondents answered the following measures twice throughout the study, 
once for inputs and once for outcomes. 
Preferred allocation norm. First, the respondents were given a brief description of 
each allocation norm (equity, equality and need). Then, they were asked to rank order 
the three allocation norms (equity, equality and need) for both inputs and outcomes. The 
allocation norm that was ranked as the first preference was used as the preferred 
allocation norm (item 7 for inputs and item 12 for outcomes in Appendix B). 
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Perceived allocation norm. Respondents were asked to rank order the degree to 
which the three allocation norms (equity, equality, and need) were used at their 
organization to allocate both inputs and outcomes. The allocation norm that was ranked 
as the first preference was used as the perceived allocation norm (item 1 for inputs and 
item 31 for outcomes in Appendix C). 
Norm fit. Norm fit was operationalized as a dummy variable separately for inputs 
and outcomes. If the respondent gave the same ranking to both his/her preferred 
allocation norm and perceived allocation norm, than that was coded as a fit (1), if the 
preferred and perceived allocation norm had different rankings than it was coded as a 
misfit (0).  
Norm misfit. Norm misfit was operationalized as a dummy variable separately 
for inputs and outcomes. If the respondent gave different rankings to his/her preferred 
allocation norm and perceived allocation norm, than that was coded as a misfit (1), if the 
preferred and perceived allocation norm had the same rankings than it was coded as a 
fit (0).  
Distributive justice. Distributive justice was measured with a 4-item scale 
developed by Colquitt (2001). The scale was given to the respondents twice, one time 
for inputs and one time for outcomes. Sample items include: “Does your (outcome) 
reflect the effort you have put into your work?” and “Is your (outcome) justified, given 
your performance?” The responses were measured on a response scale from 1 (to a small 
extent) to 5 (to a large extent). Cronbach’s alpha was .88 for outcomes and .87 for inputs 
(items 11-14 for inputs and items 41-44 for outcomes in Appendix C). 
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Procedural justice. Procedural justice measure was adopted from a 7-item scale 
developed by Colquitt (2001). As with distributive justice, respondents were asked about 
their procedural justice judgments about inputs and outcomes separately. Sample items 
include: “Have you been able to express your views and feelings during allocation 
procedures?” and “Have the allocation procedures been free of bias?” The responses 
were measured on a response scale from 1 (to a small extent) to 5 (to a large extent). 
Cronbach’s alpha was .83 for outcomes and .84 for inputs (items 15-21 for inputs and 
items 45-51 for outcomes in Appendix C). 
Interactional justice. Interactional justice was measured with the 9-item scale 
developed by Colquitt (2001) and respondents were asked to indicate their interactional 
justice judgments separately for inputs and outcomes. Although Colquitt had two factors 
under interactional justice (interpersonal and informational justice), a factor analysis 
revealed that all the items loaded on a single factor so I combined those two measures to 
form interactional justice. Sample items from the measure are, “To what extent has the 
authority figure that enacted the procedures treated you in a polite manner?” and “To 
what extent has the authority figure that enacted the procedures explained the procedures 
thoroughly?” The responses were measured on a response scale from 1 (to a small 
extent) to 5 (to a large extent). Cronbach’s alpha was .84 for outcomes and .94 for inputs 
(items 22-30 for inputs and items 52-60 for outcomes in Appendix C). 
Outcome satisfaction. Outcome satisfaction was measured by two items 
(Colquitt, 2001). Respondents used a 5-point Likert type scale (strongly disagree-
strongly agree) and indicated their outcome satisfaction with inputs and outcomes 
separately. The items include “The (outcome) I am currently receiving is satisfactory” 
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and “I am satisfied with my (outcome) in this course.” Cronbach’s alpha was .93 for 
outcomes and .90 for inputs (items 9-10 for inputs and items 39-40 for outcomes in 
Appendix C). 
Performance. Performance was be measured with a self-report measure of 
performance adopted from Welbourne, Johnson and Erez (1998). Respondents rated 
their own performance on 5 dimensions (job, career, innovator, team, and organization) 
on a 5-point Likert type scale (1= “needs much improvement”, 2= “needs some 
improvement”, 3= “satisfactory”, 4= “good” and 5= “excellent”). Cronbach’s alpha was 
.94 for this scale (items 61-80 in Appendix C). 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
In order to test the adequacy of the factor structures of the measures in the study, 
confirmatory factor analyses were performed. These analyses were performed using 
LISREL on surveys administered at time one and time three.  
For the measures used in the survey administered at time one (agreeableness, 
self-efficacy, concern for others, allocentrism, idiocentrism, power, economic goal 
priority and humanistic goal priority), a 8-factor model (χ2 = 9078.722; df = 3626, p 
<.05; GFI = .69; NFI = .80; NNFI = .86; CFI = .87; RMSEA = .06) revealed that all the 
items loaded on their intended factors.  
For the measures used in the survey administered at time three, there were some 
concerns with regard to the measures of outcome favorability and outcome satisfaction 
as the items were very similar and a high correlation was expected between the scales. 
Results showed that a 6-factor model (χ2 = 3786.30; df = 930, p <.05; GFI = .64; NFI = 
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.90; NNFI = .91; CFI = .92; RMSEA = .10) was marginally, significantly different (∆χ2 
= 10.13; ∆df = 5; p = .07). than a 5-factor model where outcome favorability and 
outcome satisfaction were loaded on a single factor (χ2 = 3796.430; df = 935, p <.05; 
GFI = .64; NFI = .89; NNFI = .91; CFI = .91; RMSEA = .10). Thus, outcome 
satisfaction and outcome favorability were treated as separate constructs in the study. 
Another concern with the measures in the third survey was the interactional 
justice measure. In the justice literature, there is some evidence that looks at interactional 
justice as two separate constructs, interpersonal justice and informational justice. Results 
showed that a 7-factor model (χ2 = 3520.303; df = 924, p <.05; GFI = .66; NFI = .90; 
NNFI = .90; CFI = .92; RMSEA = .10) where interactional justice was treated as two 
separate constructs were significantly different (∆χ2 = 265.997; ∆df = 6; p < .01). than a 
6-factor model (χ2 = 3786.30; df = 930, p <.05; GFI = .64; NFI = .90; NNFI = .91; CFI = 
.92; RMSEA = .10). Despite this, however, interactional justice was treated as one 
variable in the model for parsimonious interpretation.  
Analysis 
The first part of the model that looks at the antecedents of recipient allocation 
preferences was tested using multinomial logistic regression. For all the other analysis, 
hierarchical multiple regression was used. All the variables were centered around the 
mean.  
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Antecedents of a Recipient’s Preference for an Allocation Norm 
The first step in my data analyses was to test how the recipients viewed the 
different resource categories. Although no formal hypotheses were formulated, the first 
two hypotheses of the study were based on the prediction that monetary and status 
resources would be seen as outcomes of work whereas information, services, goods and 
affiliation would be seen as inputs to work. Table 2 presents the results of rotated factor 
analysis of different resource categories. One way to interpret these results is that 
respondents of the survey viewed monetary and status resources as an outcome of work 
and information, services and goods as an input to work. The only outcome category that 
did not load on its predicted factor was affiliation. This outcome category was expected 
to load on input to work factor but loaded on a separate factor by itself. Thus, in a way, 
respondents viewed affiliation/friendship as neither an input to work nor a consequence 
of work. 
 
TABLE 2 
Factor Analysis for Resource Categories 
Resource Category Input Outcome X 
1. Affiliation .03 .06 .87 
2. Status -.07 .81 .32 
3. Information .59 -.27 .21 
4. Money .09 .69 -.46 
5. Good  .74 .14 -.26 
6. Services .71 .03 .05 
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All the analyses in this chapter are built on this distinction among the resource 
types. In other words, all the analyses, consistent with the way the data was collected, 
were run separately for inputs and outcomes and reported as such. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that for the allocation of resources that are perceived as a 
consequence of work recipients will prefer the equity norm to the equality and the need 
norms. Preliminary analysis of the data revealed that 71.56% of the respondents 
preferred the equity norm, 21.78% preferred the equality norm and 6.67% preferred the 
need norm for the allocation of inputs. To formally test this hypothesis, chi-square 
goodness of fit test was conducted. A chi-square goodness of fit test allows to test 
whether the observed proportions for a categorical variable differ from being equal. 
Table 3 reports the results of this test where the equity norm is the comparison group. As 
can be seen in the table, the overall model was significant (χ2 = 155.627, p < .05) and the 
observed proportions were significantly different from each other as reported by the 
Wald statistics (z = -7.29, p < .05; z = -8.79, p <.05). Hypothesis 1, thus, was supported. 
 
TABLE 3 
Chi-square Test for Outcomes 
 B Wald Sig. 
Equality -1.19 -7.29 .01 
Need -2.37 -8.79 .01 
χ2 = 155.627 p < .05    
 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that for the allocation of resources that are perceived as 
an input to work recipients will prefer the equality norm to the equity and the need 
norms. Contrary to this hypothesis, 50.22% of the respondents preferred the need norm 
for the allocation of inputs, whereas only 21.52% preferred the equality norm and 
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28.25% preferred the equity norm. Table 4 presents the results of the chi-square 
goodness of fit tests for this hypothesis where need is the comparison group. The results 
show that the overall model was significant (χ2 = 30.143, p < .05), however, hypothesis 
2, was not supported. 
 
TABLE 4 
Chi-square Test for Inputs 
 B z Sig. 
Equity -.58 -3.65 .01 
Equality -.85 -4.91 .01 
χ2 = 30.143 p < .05    
 
 
I used multinomial logistic regression to test hypotheses 3 through 9 and results 
of the multinomial logistic regression to test these hypotheses can be seen in Tables 5a 
through 5f. Multinomial logistic regression is a special form of logistic regression where 
the dependent variable has more than two categories. In multinomial logistic regression, 
a set of logit coefficients is estimated for each of the categories of the dependent 
variable. These estimated logit coefficients indicate the independent log odds of each 
independent variable of being in the particular dependent variable category of interest 
versus being in the base (contrast) category. In multinomial logistic regression, one of 
the categories of the outcome variable is set a comparison group and all results are 
displayed in comparison to that group. In the following analyses, the need norm is set as 
the comparison group.
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TABLE 5a 
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Outcomes – The Need Norm as Comparison Group 
Variable 
χ2 
(model) 
df 
(model) 
Sig. 
(model) B Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
Outcome Scarcity Equity 8.37 2 .02 -.28 .57 1 .45 .76 
 Equality    .38 .85 1 .36 1.46 
Concern for Others Equity .82 2 .67 -.23 .15 1 .70 .79 
 Equality    .08 .01 1 .91 1.08 
Need is the comparison group. 
 
 
TABLE 5b 
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Inputs – The Need Norm as Comparison Group 
Variable 
χ2 
(model) 
df 
(model) 
Sig. 
(model) B Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
Input Scarcity Equity .44 2 .80 .00 .00 1 .98 1.01 
 Equality    .14 .40 1 .53 1.15 
Concern for Others Equity .15 2 .93 .10 .09 1 .77 1.10 
 Equality    -.05 .02 1 .88 .95 
Need is the comparison group. 
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TABLE 5c 
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Outcomes – The Equity Norm as Comparison Group 
Variable 
χ2 
(model) 
df 
(model) 
Sig. 
(model) B Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
Economic Goal Equality 1.89 2 .39 .42 1.40 1 .24 1.52 
 Need    -.22 .22 1 .64 .80 
Resource  Equality 9.08 2 .01 -.25 .98 1 .32 .78 
Dependency Need    1.15 6.69 1 .01 3.14 
Idiocentrism Equality 3.41 2 .18 -.10 .06 1 .80 .90 
 Need    1.18 3.09 1 .08 3.26 
Self-Efficacy Equality 1.31 2 .52 -.19 .31 1 .58 .83 
 Need    .53 .82 1 .37 1.70 
Equity is the comparison group. 
 
 
TABLE 5d 
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Inputs – The Equity Norm as Comparison Group 
Variable 
χ2 
(model) 
df 
(model) 
Sig. 
(model) B Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
Economic Goal Equality 5.39 2 .07 -.17 .16 1 .69 .85 
 Need    -.70 4.10 1 .04 .50 
Resource  Equality .41 2 .81 .11 .15 1 .70 1.12 
Dependency Need    -.06 .06 1 .81 .95 
Idiocentrism Equality 5.85 2 .05 -.37 .63 1 .43 .69 
 Need    -.92 5.37 1 .02 .40 
Self-Efficacy Equality 6.96 2 .03 -.54 1.66 1 .20 .58 
 Need    -.90 6.61 1 .01 .41 
Equity is the comparison group. 
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TABLE 5e 
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Outcomes – The Equality Norm as Comparison Group 
Variable 
χ2 
(model) 
df 
(model) 
Sig. 
(model) B Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
Humanistic Goal Equity 3.20 2 .20 .09 3.39 1 .53 1.10 
 Need    -.29 1.56 1 .21 .74 
Agreeableness Equity .88 2 .64 -.31 .52 1 .47 .73 
 Need    -.67 .72 1 .40 .51 
Allocentrism Equity 1.51 2 .47 -.58 1.45 1 .23 .56 
 Need    -.30 .12 1 .73 .74 
Equality is the comparison group. 
 
 
TABLE 5f 
Tests of Multinomial Regression for Inputs – The Equality Norm as Comparison Group 
Variable 
χ2 
(model) 
df 
(model) 
Sig. 
(model) B Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
Humanistic Goal Equity 16.52 2 .00 -.48 3.96 1 .05 .62 
 Need    -.76 11.42 1 .00 .47 
Agreeableness Equity .33 2 .85 .27 .00 1 .95 1.03 
 Need    .22 .24 1 .63 1.25 
Allocentrism Equity 1.41 2 .49 -.16 .08 1 .78 .85 
 Need     -.54 1.13 1 .29 .58 
Equality is the comparison group. 
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Hypothesis 3 predicted perceptions of scarcity of a resource will be positively 
related to recipients’ preference for the need norm to the equity and the equality norms. 
The first row of Table 5a shows the results of multinomial regression ran to test this 
hypothesis for outcomes. The overall model was significant (χ2 = 8.37, p = .02 < .05), 
however, the coefficients for the equity and equality norms were not significant. 
Furthermore, although not significant, the coefficient for the equity norm (B = -.28, p = 
.45) was in the predicted direction whereas the coefficient for the equality norm (B = 
.38, p = .36) was not indicating that when recipients perceived outcomes as scarce, they 
were .76 times less likely to prefer the equity norm to the need norm and 1.46 times 
more likely to prefer the equality norm to the need norm. For inputs (Table 5b, first 
row), the overall model was not significant (χ2 = .44, p = .80). Hypothesis 3 was not 
supported either for outcomes or for inputs. 
Hypothesis 4a stated that perceptions of economic goal priority would be 
positively related to recipients’ preference for the equity norm. The χ2 statistic for the 
model was marginally significant for inputs (χ2 = 5.39, p = .07) but insignificant for 
outcomes (χ2 = 1.89, p = .39). For inputs, the model was only significant in the contrast 
of the equity and need norms (B = -.70, exp (B) = .50, p < .05) and for every increase in 
economic goal priority, there was a increase of .50 in the log odds of preferring the 
equity norm compared to preferring the need norm. Furthermore, for every increase in 
economic goal priority, there was a increase of .85 in the log odds of preferring the 
equity norm to the equality norm. Thus, the hypothesis that perceptions of economic 
goal priority being positively related to recipients’ preference for the equity norm was 
supported for inputs and not supported for outcomes. 
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Hypothesis 4b stated that perceptions of humanistic goal priority would be 
positively related to recipients’ preference for the equality norm. As with economic goal 
priority, the model was significant with inputs (χ2 = 16.52, p < .05) but insignificant with 
outcomes (χ2 = 3.20, p > .10). In other words, humanistic goal priority was related to 
recipients’ preference of an allocation norm for inputs but not for outcomes. And for 
inputs, for every increase in humanistic goal priority, there was an increase of .62 in the 
log odds of preferring the equality norm to the equity norm (B = -.48, exp (B) = .62, p < 
.05) and an increase of .47 of preferring the equality norm to the need norm (B = -.76, 
exp (B) = .47, p < .05). Thus, humanistic goal priority was positively related to 
recipients’ preference for the equality norm to the equity and need norms for inputs. This 
hypothesis was supported for inputs but not for outcomes. 
The next hypothesis of the study (hypothesis 5) stated that resource dependency 
in the environment would be positively related to recipients’ preference for the equity 
norm over the equality and need norms. For inputs, the model was insignificant (χ2 = .41, 
p > .10), suggesting that resource dependency differentiation did not influence 
recipients’ norm preferences for the allocation of inputs. For outcomes, however, the 
model was significant (χ2 = 9.08, p < .05). A one-unit increase in resource dependency 
differentiation increased the odds of a recipient preferring the need norm by 3.14 times 
(B = 1.15, exp (B) = 3.14, p < .05) and decreased the odds of a recipient preferring the 
equality norm by .78 times (B = -.25, exp (B) = .78, p < .05). Thus, resource dependency 
differentiation made a difference in recipients’ allocation norm preference for outcomes 
but not as predicted. Recipients preferred the need norm when they perceived their 
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environment as high on resource dependency differentiation. Thus, this hypothesis was 
rejected for the allocation of both inputs and outcomes.  
The next set of hypotheses in the study (hypotheses 6-9) dealt with how various 
individual difference variables would affect a recipient’s preferred allocation norm. 
Among these variables, I failed to find support for most of them, agreeableness (χ2 = .33, 
p =.85 for inputs; χ2 = .88, p = .64 for outcomes), concern for others (χ2 = .15, p = .93 for 
inputs; χ2 = .82, p = .67 for outcomes) and allocentrism (χ2 = 1.41, p = .49 for inputs; χ2 = 
.1.51, p = .47 for outcomes) were not significant predictors of a recipient’s preference 
for an allocation norm. Thus, hypotheses 6, 7 and 8a were not supported. 
Hypothesis 8b predicted that idiocentrism would be positively related to 
recipients’ preference for the equity norm. Although not significant for outcomes (χ2 = 
3.41, p > .10), the results showed that idiocentrism was a significant predictor of 
recipient allocation norm preference for inputs (χ2 = 5.85, p < .05). More specifically, 
each unit increase in idiocentrism decreased the odds of a recipient preferring the need 
norm compared to the equity norm by .40 times (B = -.92, exp (B) = .40, p < .05) and 
decreased the odds of preferring the equality norm to the equity norm by .69 times (B = 
-.37, exp (B) = .69, p > .05). Hypothesis 8b, thus, was supported for inputs but not 
supported for outcomes. 
Hypothesis 9 stated that self-efficacy would be positively related to recipients’ 
preference for the equity norm. The results showed that this hypothesis was not 
supported for outcomes (χ2 = 1.31, p > .05). For inputs, the multinomial regression 
showed that self-efficacy was a significant predictor of recipient norm preference (χ2 = 
6.96, p < .05). More specifically, every unit increase in self-efficacy decreased the odds 
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of a recipient preferring the need norm to the equity norm by .41 times (B = -.90, exp 
(B) = .41, p < .05) and decreased the odds of a recipient preferring the equality norm to 
the equity norm by .69 times (B = -.54, exp (B) = .20, p > .05). This hypothesis was 
supported for inputs but not for outcomes. 
Effects of the Fit/Misfit between a Recipient’s Preferred Allocation Norm 
and the Norm Used by the Organization 
The second part of the proposed model dealt with the effects of a fit/misfit 
between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the norm used by the organization as 
perceived by the recipient.  
Hypothesis 10 dealt with the effects of misfit between a recipient’s preferred 
allocation norm and the perceived norm used by the organization. More specifically, 
hypothesis 10 stated that a misfit between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the 
perceived allocation norm used by the organization will be negatively related to the 
distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice, outcome satisfaction and 
performance. In order to test this hypothesis, I dummy-coded misfit using fit as the 
reference group and regressed this dummy-coded variable on the dependent variables 
(Table 6a for outcomes, Table 6b for inputs). I also created a cell means table for all the 
different types of misfit and fit and the dependent variables (presented after each 
regression table).
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TABLE 6a 
Misfit Regression Analyses for Outcomes 
Step and Variables 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Interactional 
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance 
 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 
                
Step 1. Misfit  -.15* .02* .02 -.15* .02* .02 -.15* .02* .02 -.12† .02† .02 -.08 .01 .01 
† p < .10 . * p < .05. ** p < .01 
 
 
TABLE 6b 
Misfit Regression Analyses for Inputs 
Step and Variables 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Interactional 
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance 
 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 
                
Step 1. Misfit  -.04 .00 .00 -.05 .00 .00 -.15* .02* .02 -.12† .02† .02 -.08 .01 .01 
† p < .10 . * p < .05. ** p < .01                
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Below I discuss my findings for hypothesis 10 in regards to outcomes before 
turning next to inputs. The regressions revealed a significant negative main effect of the 
misfit on distributive justice (β = -.15, p < .05), procedural justice (β = -.15, p < .05), 
interactional justice (β = -.15, p < .05) and outcome satisfaction (β = -.12, p < .10), 
providing support for Hypothesis 10a, 10b, 10c and 10d for outcomes. Cell means for 
the different misfit and fit categories for outcomes are also presented in Table 6c. These 
findings suggested that a misfit between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the 
allocation norm used by the organization as perceived by the recipient had negative 
effects on recipients’ distributive, procedural and interactional justice judgments and 
outcome satisfaction perceptions. Although there was only marginal effects for misfit on 
performance (β = -.08, p > .05), i.e., hypothesis 10e, the results were still in the predicted 
direction. A misfit between a recipients’ preferred allocation norm and the norm used by 
the organization as perceived by the recipient had a negative effect on recipient 
performance.  
Turning next to the findings regarding inputs for hypothesis 10, the results were 
much less supportive (refer to Table 6d for cell means for misfit and fit categories). 
Although, all the coefficients were negative, indicating that misfit was negatively related 
to distributive, procedural, interactional justice, outcome satisfaction and performance, 
only the coefficients for interactional justice and outcome satisfaction were significant (β 
= -.15, p < .05 and β = -.12, p < .10, respectively). Thus, for the allocation of inputs, 
Hypotheses 10c and 10d was supported and Hypotheses 10a, 10b and 10e were rejected. 
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TABLE 6c 
Cell Means for Hypothesis 10 for Outcomes 
Preferred-
Perceived 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural
Justice 
Interactional
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance
Equity-Equality 
 Mean 2.03 2.05 3.07 2.26 3.39 
 S. D. .72 .71 .85 .84 .70 
 N 45 45 45 45 45 
Equity-Need 
 Mean 1.75 1.84 2.57 2.15 3.21 
 S. D. .59 .75 1.08 .99 .6820 
 N 20 20 20 20 20 
Equality-Need 
 Mean 1.75 2.15 3.00 2.06 3.40 
 S. D. 1.06 .87 1.18 1.32 .91 
 N 8 8 8 8 8 
Equality-Equity 
 Mean 1.92 1.73 2.90 1.67 3.31 
 S. D. 1.16 .58 .72 .80 .80 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
Need-Equality 
 Mean 2.25 2.13 2.50 2.13 2.94 
 S. D. 1.02 .60 .90 1.03 1.06 
 N 4 4 4 4 4 
Need-Equity 
 Mean 2.01 2.37 3.04 2.30 3.16 
 S. D. .84 .80 .88 1.10 .71 
 N 5 5 5 5 5 
Equity-Equity 
 Mean 2.26 2.25 3.26 2.38 3.48 
 S. D. .87 .67 .99 .90 .71 
 N 76 76 76 76 76 
Equality-Equality 
 Mean 2.11 2.02 2.90 2.53 3.36 
 S. D. .96 .90 .95 1.43 .51 
 N 16 16 16 16 16 
Need-Need 
 Mean 1.65 1.93 3.24 1.60 2.65 
 S. D. .60 .72 .58 .89 .98 
 N 5 5 5 5 5 
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TABLE 6d 
Cell Means for Hypothesis 10 for Inputs 
Preferred-
Perceived 
Distributive
Justice 
Procedural
Justice 
Interactional
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance
Equity-Equality      
 Mean 2.57 2.29 2.64 2.21 3.34 
 S. D. 1.20 .97 .90 .86 .91 
 N 12 12 12 12 12 
Equity-Need      
 Mean 2.92 2.38 3.04 2.53 3.39 
 S. D. .83 .61 .91 .88 .76 
 N 31 31 31 31 31 
Equality-Need      
 Mean 2.58 2.55 3.23 2.44 3.48 
 S. D. .82 .65 .89 .85 .77 
 N 25 25 25 25 25 
Equality-Equity      
 Mean 2.08 2.25 2.94 2.58 3.13 
 S. D. 1.16 1.20 1.05 1.11 1.02 
 N 6 6 6 6 6 
Need-Equality      
 Mean 2.74 2.41 3.06 2.81 3.13 
 S. D. .73 .66 .94 .81 .71 
 N 26 26 26 26 26 
Need-Equity      
 Mean 3.08 2.78 2.84 2.92 3.14 
 S. D. .76 .83 .79 .81 .56 
 N 13 13 13 13 13 
Equity-Equity      
 Mean 2.83 2.83 3.53 3.04 3.45 
 S. D. .92 .79 .71 1.06 .67 
 N 13 13 13 13 13 
Equality-Equality      
 Mean 2.84 2.40 3.44 2.46 3.18 
 S. D. .92 .79 .71 1.06 .67 
 N 14 14 14 14 14 
Need-Need      
 Mean 2.78 2.50 3.22 2.83 3.48 
 S. D. .88 .71 1.13 .86 .68 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
 
 
Hypothesis 11 stated that a misfit between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm 
and the perceived allocation norm used by the organization such that the recipient 
prefers the equity norm and the perceived allocation norm is the equality or the need 
norm, will lead to lower perceptions of a) distributive justice, b) procedural justice, 
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c) interactional justice, d) outcome satisfaction and e) performance compared to other 
types of misfit. To test this hypothesis, I created three categories: one category for misfit 
types of interest (where the recipient prefers the equity norm but perceives the 
organization as using the equality or the need norms), another for all other types of 
misfit and one fit category. When running the regressions, I used the misfit category for 
all other types of misfit as the base category. 
First turning to outcomes (Table 7a), the results indicate that there were no 
significant results for this prediction. The way the data is coded, a significant main effect 
of misfit on the dependent variables would mean support for these hypotheses. As can be 
seen in the first row of Table 7a, none of the coefficients were significant. Results were 
not different for the allocation of inputs, either, i.e., none of the coefficients for misfit 
interest category was significant (Table 7b, first row). Tables 7c (for outcomes) and 7d 
(for inputs) show the cell means for these categories. Thus, hypotheses 11a through 11e 
were rejected for both the allocation of outcomes and of inputs.  
Hypotheses 12a through 12e dealt with the interactive effects of outcome 
favorability and norm fit on the dependent variables. More specifically, the hypotheses 
stated that outcome favorability would moderate the relationship between norm misfit 
and the dependent variables such that favorable outcomes will decrease the negative 
effects of misfit on the dependent variables. Step 3 in Tables 8a and 8b show the results 
of the tests for this hypothesis for outcomes and inputs, respectively. Tables 8c (for 
outcomes) and 8d (for inputs) show the cell means for misfit-fit categories by high-low 
outcome favorability. Some of the values in some of the cells are missing as there were 
very few cases and cell means could not have been calculated.
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TABLE 7a 
Regression Analyses for Different Types of Misfit for Outcomes 
Step and Variables 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Interactional 
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance 
 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 
Misfit (preferred equity- 
perceived equality/need) 
-.02 .02 .02 .01 .02† .02 .02 .02† .02 .15 .03† .03 .05 .01 .01 
Fit .13   .16†   .16†   .23*   .11   
† p < .10 . * p < .05. ** p < .01 
 
 
TABLE 7b 
Regression Analyses for Different Types of Misfit for Inputs 
Step and Variables Distributive  
Justice 
Procedural  
Justice 
Interactional 
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction 
Performance 
 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 
Misfit (preferred equity- 
perceived equality/need) 
.06 .00 .00 -.11 .01 .01 -.06 .02† .02 -.10 .02† .02 .06 .01 .01 
Fit .06   .00   .12   .08   .10   
† p < .10 . * p < .05. ** p < .01 
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TABLE 7c 
Cell Means for Hypothesis 11 for Outcomes 
Fit and Misfit 
Categories 
Distributive
Justice 
Procedural
Justice 
Interactional
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance
Misfit (Equity-Equality/Need) 
 Mean 1.95 1.99 2.95 2.26 3.37 
 S. D. .68 .73 .94 .87 .66 
 N 62 62 62 62 62 
Fit      
 Mean 2.19 2.19 3.19 2.35 3.42 
 S. D. .89 .73 .95 1.03 .70 
 N 92 92 92 92 92 
Misfit (Other)      
 Mean 1.95 1.98 2.94 1.93 3.25 
 S. D. 1.07 .71 .83 .99 .82 
 N 34 34 34 34 34 
 
 
TABLE 7d 
Cell Means for Hypothesis 11 for Inputs 
Fit and Misfit 
Categories 
Distributive
Justice 
Procedural
Justice 
Interactional
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance
Misfit (Equity-Equality/Need) 
 Mean 2.82 2.35 2.93 2.44 3.38 
 S. D. .94 .72 .92 .88 .80 
 N 43 43 43 43 43 
Fit      
 Mean 2.79 2.54 3.30 2.80 3.43 
 S. D. .91 .73 1.07 .91 .68 
 N 89 89 89 89 89 
Misfit (Other)      
 Mean 2.69 2.51 3.07 2.68 3.26 
 S. D. .83 .74 .90 .86 .74 
 N 70 70 70 70 70 
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TABLE 8a 
Moderated Regression Analyses for Outcomes 
Step and Variables 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Interactional 
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance 
 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 
Step 1. Misfit -.10 .01 .01 -.13 .02 .02 -.16 .03 .03 -.22* .05* .05 -.10 .01 .01 
Step 2. Outcome Favorability .35** .12** .13 .43** .18** .20 .45** .19** .22 .50** .24** .29 .13 .02 .03 
Step 3. Misfit x Outcome Favorability -.31 .02 .14 -.35 .02 .22 .05 .00 .22 .03 .00 .29 .00 .00 .03 
† p < .10 . * p < .05. ** p < .01 
 
 
TABLE 8b 
Moderated Regression Analyses for Inputs 
Step and Variables 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Interactional 
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance 
 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 β ∆R2 R2 
Step 1. Misfit -.03 .00 .00 -.04 .00 .00 -.15* .02* .02 -.12† .02† .02 -.08 .01 .01 
Step 2. Outcome Favorability .24** .06** .06 .29** .08** .09 .27** .07** .10 .68** .45** .47 .09 .00 .01 
Step 3. Misfit x Outcome Favorability -.25* .02* .08 -.14 .01 .09 -.19† .01† .11 .03 .00 .47 .10 .01 .02 
† p < .10 . * p < .05. ** p < .01 
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TABLE 8c 
Cell Means for Hypothesis 12 for Outcomes 
Preferred-
Perceived 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Interactional 
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance 
Equity-Equality      
 Low Fav. Mean 1.38 1.50 2.52 3.25 2.93 
  S. D. .53 .71 .27 2.47 .95 
  N 2 2 2 2 2 
 High Fav. Mean 3.00 2.17 3.44 3.50 3.47 
  S. D. 1.41 1.65 .47 .71 .52 
  N 2 2 2 2 2 
Equity-Need      
 Low Fav. Mean 1.50 1.55 2.38 2.00 3.06 
  S. D. .50 .31 1.10 1.41 .97 
  N 5 5 5 5 5 
 High Fav. Mean 2.41 2.44 3.66 3.11 3.54 
  S. D. .66 .58 .64 .59 .82 
  N 14 14 14 14 14 
Equality-Need      
 Low Fav. Mean . . . . . 
  S. D. . . . . . 
  N 1 1 1 1 1 
 High Fav. Mean 2.39 2.44 3.71 2.78 3.64 
  S. D. .52 .60 1.07 .71 .59 
  N 9 9 9 9 9 
Equality-Equity      
 Low Fav. Mean . . . . . 
  S. D. . . . . . 
  N 1 1 1 1 1 
 High Fav. Mean . 2.58 3.72 2.75 3.65 
  S. D. . .12 .39 .35 .42 
  N 2 2 2 2 2 
Need-Equality      
 Low Fav. Mean 2.25 1.67 2.56 . 2.93 
  S. D. 1.41 .71 1.26 . .74 
  N 2 2 2 2 2 
 High Fav. Mean 2.54 2.45 3.12 3.46 . 
  S. D. .77 .72 .94 .95 . 
  N 13 13 13 13 13 
Need-Equity      
 Low Fav. Mean . . . . . 
  S. D. . . . . . 
  N 0 0 0 0 0 
 High Fav. Mean 2.58 2.73 2.94 2.58 . 
  S. D. .68 .47 1.06 .80 . 
  N 6 6 6 6 6 
Equity-Equity      
 Low Fav. Mean . . . . . 
  S. D. . . . . . 
  N 1 1 1 1 1 
 High Fav. Mean 2.63 2.50 3.61 2.63 3.26 
  S. D. 1.10 .89 1.05 .52 .70 
  N 8 8 8 8 8 
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TABLE 8c 
Continued 
Preferred-
Perceived 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Interactional 
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance 
Equality-Equality      
 Low Fav. Mean 2.42 1.67 2.65 2.83 2.95 
  S. D. 1.84 .58 .61 1.89 .79 
  N 3 3 3 3 3 
 High Fav. Mean 2.38 2.61 3.81 3.33 3.65 
  S. D. .41 .61 .40 .75 .25 
  N 6 6 6 6 6 
Need-Need      
 Low Fav. Mean 1.75 1.83 2.38 2.15 3.50 
  S. D. 1.26 .92 .95 1.56 .92 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 
 High Fav. Mean 2.56 2.44 3.49 2.95 3.44 
  S. D. .87 .57 .70 .71 .60 
  N 20 20 20 20 20 
 
 
TABLE 8d 
Cell Means for Hypothesis 12 for Inputs 
Preferred-
Perceived 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Interactional 
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance 
Equity-Equality      
 Low Fav. Mean 2.36 2.22 2.44 2.05 3.15 
  S. D. 1.01 .85 .82 .72 .84 
  N 10 10 10 10 10 
 High Fav. Mean 3.63 2.67 3.61 3.00 4.32 
  S. D. 1.94 1.89 .71 1.41 .68 
  N 2 2 2 2 2 
Equity-Need      
 Low Fav. Mean 2.81 2.17 2.91 1.91 3.36 
  S. D. 1.01 .67 .92 .55 .80 
  N 16 16 16 16 16 
 High Fav. Mean 3.03 2.59 3.18 3.20 3.42 
  S. D. .58 .47 .91 .65 .75 
  N 15 15 15 15 15 
Equality-Need      
 Low Fav. Mean 2.75 2.45 3.08 2.03 3.46 
  S. D. .86 .64 .83 .45 .85 
  N 17 17 17 17 17 
 High Fav. Mean 2.21 2.75 3.56 3.31 3.54 
  S. D. .61 .67 .97 .84 .61 
  N 8 8 8 8 8 
Equality-Equity      
 Low Fav. Mean 1.25 1.42 2.39 1.50 2.30 
  S. D. .35 .59 1.02 .71 .71 
  N 2 2 2 2 2 
 High Fav. Mean 2.50 2.67 3.22 3.13 3.55 
  S. D. 1.22 1.25 1.09 .85 .94 
  N 4 4 4 4 4 
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TABLE 8d 
Continued 
Preferred-
Perceived 
Distributive 
Justice 
Procedural 
Justice 
Interactional 
Justice 
Outcome 
Satisfaction Performance 
Need-Equality      
 Low Fav. Mean 2.52 2.32 2.96 2.29 2.90 
  S. D. .59 .52 .95 .64 .64 
  N 14 14 14 14 14 
 High Fav. Mean 3.00 2.51 3.18 3.42 3.39 
  S. D. .81 .79 .95 .51 .71 
  N 2 2 2 2 2 
Need-Equity      
 Low Fav. Mean 3.21 2.58 2.89 2.25 3.23 
  S. D. .73 1.11 .87 .42 .56 
  N 6 6 6 6 6 
 High Fav. Mean 2.96 2.95 2.79 3.50 3.06 
  S. D. .82 .52 .79 .58 .59 
  N 7 7 7 7 7 
Equity-Equity      
 Low Fav. Mean 2.25 2.73 3.31 2.20 3.77 
  S. D. 1.16 1.11 1.24 .57 .44 
  N 5 5 5 5 5 
 High Fav. Mean 3.19 2.90 3.67 3.56 3.25 
  S. D. .89 .53 1.07 .73 .74 
  N 8 8 8 8 8 
Equality-Equality      
 Low Fav. Mean 2.84 2.19 3.32 2.00 3.08 
  S. D. 1.12 .83 .79 1.07 .69 
  N 8 8 8 8 8 
 High Fav. Mean 2.83 2.69 3.61 3.08 3.33 
  S. D. .66 .70 .60 .74 .68 
  N 6 6 6 6 6 
Need-Need      
 Low Fav. Mean 2.34 2.17 2.69 2.22 3.44 
  S. D. .81 .68 .78 .59 .82 
  N 29 29 29 29 29 
 High Fav. Mean 3.17 2.80 3.68 3.36 3.51 
  S. D. .77 .60 1.20 .69 .55 
  N 33 33 33 33 33 
 
 
First turning to the interactive effects of outcome misfit and outcome favorability 
on the dependent variables for the allocation of outcomes, none of the interaction 
coefficients were statistically significant indicating that the interaction outcome 
favorability did not moderate the relationship between norm misfit and the dependent 
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variables. Thus, hypotheses 12a through 12e were rejected for the allocation of 
outcomes. 
For the allocation of inputs, the results were more promising. More specifically, 
the interactive effects of norm misfit and outcome favorability were significant on 
distributive justice (β = -.25, p < .05) and interactional justice (β = -.19, p < .10). To 
better understand these effects I plotted their interactions. Figure 2 shows the interaction 
of misfit and outcome favorability on recipients’ distributive justice judgments. 
 
FIGURE 2 
Interaction of Misfit and Outcome Favorability on Distributive Justice for Inputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3, and not surprisingly, highest perceptions of 
distributive justice were observed when there is a fit between a recipient’s preferred 
allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization as perceived by the 
recipient and when outcome favorability was high. Furthermore, when there was a misfit 
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between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the 
organization as perceived by the recipient, outcome favorability did not seem to matter 
much. Surprisingly however, lowest perceptions of distributive justice were observed 
when there was a fit between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the allocation 
norm used by the organization as perceived by the recipient and when outcome 
favorability was low. A very similar interaction figure was also observed for the effects 
of misfit outcome favorability interaction on interactional justice. These interaction 
effects suggest that when recipients expect some form of fairness (i.e., fit between their 
preferred allocation norm and the norm used by their organization) but receive a bad 
allocation as a consequence of this norm, their reactions are the worst. The results 
presented in this sectioned are summarized in Table 9. 
 
FIGURE 3 
Interaction of Misfit and Outcome Favorability on Interactional Justice for Inputs 
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TABLE 9 
Summary of Results 
Hypothesis 1 Supported 
Hypothesis 2 Supported 
 Inputs Outcomes 
Hypothesis 3 Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 4a Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 4b Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 5 Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 6 Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 7 Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 8a Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 8b Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 9 Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 10a Not Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 10b Not Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 10c Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 10d Supported Supported 
Hypothesis 10e Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 11a Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 11b Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 11c Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 11d Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 11e Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 12a Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 12b Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 12c Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 12d Not Supported Not Supported 
Hypothesis 12e Not Supported Not Supported 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this dissertation was to understand how individuals’ preferences 
for resource allocation affect their attitudinal and behavioral reactions towards the 
organization. Building on the three main allocation norms (equity norm, equality norm 
and need norm) and taking the perspective of the recipient of an allocation, this study 
examined the antecedents of recipients’ allocation norm preferences and the effects of 
the fit or misfit between recipients’ preferred allocation norm and the perceived 
allocation norm used by the organization on organizational justice perceptions, outcome 
satisfaction and performance.  
In the study reported, I proposed and tested a two-stage model where the first 
part of the model predicted recipients’ allocation norm preferences by resource type, 
environmental characteristics and individual difference variables. The second part of the 
model dealt with the fit or misfit between recipients’ preferred allocation norms for 
inputs and outcomes (i.e., resource type) and the effects of this fit or misfit on 
perceptions of distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice, outcome 
satisfaction and performance.  
The theoretical background of the model consisted of Deutsch’s (1975) 
categorization of the allocation norms, social exchange theory (Foa & Foa, 1975) and the 
referent cognitions theory (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger, 1986, 1987). The model 
was tested with a sample of Turkish registered nurses. Data from the sample was 
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collected with three surveys administered at three different times (one week apart from 
each other). 
The following discussion summarizes the main results and highlights the major 
contributions of the study. It concludes with some limitations and several suggestions for 
future research.  
Overview of the Results 
Social exchange theory (Foa & Foa, 1975) was one of the cornerstones of the 
model proposed and tested in this dissertation. Social exchange theory classifies 
organizational resources into six main categories. Although most of the existing research 
on allocation norms have been built on these six resource categories, the overall 
conclusion of researchers (e.g., Parks et al., 1996) is that the categorization proposed by 
Foa and Foa did not adequately explain the relationship between these six classes of 
resources and allocation norm preferences of parties in an allocation. Although not 
directly hypothesized, an attempt was made in this dissertation to re-evaluate the 
dimensionality of the six resource classes of the social exchange theory. More 
specifically, the model in this dissertation proposed that a resource could be classified on 
two main dimensions; (1) resources that are given to an employee to be used as an input 
to his/her work and (inputs) (2) resources that are given to an employee as a 
consequence of the work he/she has done (outcomes). All the hypotheses in the model 
were tested separately for these two different resource types and reported separately. 
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Interestingly enough, recipients’ preferences and reactions were very different for these 
two different types of resources. The below discussion elaborates on these differences.  
Antecedents of an Allocation Norm 
The antecedents of recipient allocation norm preference that were proposed and 
tested in this study were nature of the resource, goal priority, resource dependency, 
agreeableness, self-efficacy, concern for others, allocentrism and idiocentrism. The 
results showed strong support for the relationship between resource category and 
recipient allocation norm preference. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, 
respondents in this study indicated their preference for two main categories of resources, 
resources allocated as an input to one’s work (inputs) and resources allocated as a 
consequence of one’s work (outcomes). For resources that are perceived as a 
consequence of work, i.e., outcomes, recipients preferred the equity norm to the equality 
and the need norms. For resources that are perceived as an input to work, however, the 
recipients preferred the need norm to the equity and equality norms. This finding was 
noteworthy as indicated that recipients’ actually differentiated between these two types 
of resources and had different preferences for their allocation. 
Post-hoc analysis of the data revealed some interesting explanations for 
allocation norm preference or recipients. Recipients preferred allocation norms that 
would yield themselves the best possible allocation. When asked to indicate the 
allocation norm that would yield the best allocation for themselves, 45.9% of the 
recipients indicated that the need norm would yield the best allocation for inputs and 
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58.4% indicated that the equity norm would yield the best allocation for outcomes. 
Furthermore, a logistic regression analysis of this best allocation-yielding norm on 
allocation norm preference indicated that this variable was a significant predictor of 
allocation norm preference of recipient for both inputs and outcomes. Thus, in a way, 
recipients preferred the allocation norms that gave themselves the best allocation. 
In terms of environmental characteristics predicting recipients’ allocation norm 
preferences, the results were again different for the allocation of inputs and outcomes. 
For the allocation of inputs, goal priority (both economic and humanistic) was a 
significant predictor of recipient allocation preferences. More specifically, recipients 
who perceived their organization as having an economic goal priority preferred the 
equity norm while the recipients who perceived their organization as having a 
humanistic goal priority preferred the equality norm. Resource dependency did not make 
a difference in the preference of an allocation norm for the allocation of inputs but was a 
significant predictor for outcomes. When the recipients perceived that resource 
dependency differential was high, i.e., both they and their coworkers depended on each 
other for critical resources for their work; their preferred allocation norm was the need 
norm. 
As for individual difference variables, the results were less than ideal. Of the 
eight hypothesized effects, there were only two significant relationships and both of 
those relationships were observed for the allocation of inputs. Recipients who had higher 
self-efficacy and who were more individualistic were more likely to prefer the equity 
norm.  
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Although disappointing, the weakness of the effects of the effects of individual 
difference variables on recipients’ allocation norm preference were not that surprising. 
Individual differences in justice literature have been shown to have weak effects in 
general (e.g., equity sensitivity, personality, etc.). Furthermore, measures used to assess 
individual difference variables in the study might have been less than ideal. Although all 
the measures used were established measures, their Turkish translations were not 
validated in previous research (except for the collectivism-individualism scale). This 
explanation may be especially true for the insignificant effects seen with the 
agreeableness measure, which had very low reliability.  
A second explanation, yet a related one, is that there was not enough variance on 
the individual difference variables between the subjects to capture different allocation 
norm preferences. It can be argued that nursing is a profession that individuals self-select 
into and that those individuals tend to be similar to each other with respect to individual 
difference variables. Thus, the homogeneity of the sample in terms of the individual 
difference variables included in the model may have prevented me from finding 
meaningful results. 
It is also possible that the strong professional norms of the nursing profession did 
not allow individual differences to make a difference in recipients’ allocation norm 
preferences. This explanation makes even more appeal when one considers that the data 
showed strong support for the effects of environmental characteristics (goal priority and 
resource dependency) on recipient allocation norm preference. It may be that strong 
environmental and cultural influences do not allow recipients’ individual differences to 
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affect their allocation norm preferences. This explanation is also supported by the 
argument that organizations are strong situations that does not allow its members’ 
individual difference variables affect their attitudes or behaviors (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 
1989). 
One interesting general theme across the results of this first part of the model was 
that both environmental characteristics and individual difference variables had different 
relationships with recipients’ allocation norm preference depending on the type of the 
resource being allocated. In other words, variables that predicted norm preference for 
inputs did not predict norm preference for outcomes and vice versa. The results of this 
study not only showed that recipients discriminated between different types of resources 
but also different factors influenced norm preference for different types of resources. For 
the allocation of outcomes, regardless of their individual differences or environmental 
influences, the recipients’ preferred the equity norm. For the allocation of inputs, 
however, environmental characteristics and recipients’ individual differences made a 
difference in what recipients’ preferred in terms of allocation norm preference. 
Although not hypothesized in the model, I had also conducted some post-hoc 
analyses regarding the interactive effects of environmental and individual difference 
variables on recipients’ allocation norm preference. These interactions, however, did not 
provide any meaningful result to explain the variance in recipients’ allocation norm 
preference over and beyond that explained by the main effects. 
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Misfit and Fit of Preferred and Perceived Allocation Norms and Consequences 
The findings in this the second part of the study indicated that a misfit between 
recipients’ preferred allocation norm and perceived allocation norm used by the 
organization had negative effects on recipients’ organizational justice perceptions as 
well as outcome satisfaction and performance. Moreover, as with the antecedents of 
allocation norm preferences, these effects varied with different resource categories.  
 For the allocation of outcomes, a misfit was significantly and negatively related 
to distributive, procedural and interactional justice perceptions as well as outcome 
satisfaction. For the allocation of inputs, however, a misfit was only significantly related 
to interactional justice and outcome satisfaction. In other words, a misfit mattered more 
to recipients when outcomes were allocated than when inputs were allocated. 
Outcome favorability, as predicted, reduced the negative effects of recipients’ 
allocation norm preference misfit, but only for inputs and only for two of the dependent 
variables, distributive justice and interactional justice. Furthermore, an interaction of 
these plots revealed that lowest perceptions of distributive and interactional justice were 
observed when there was a fit between the recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the 
allocation norm used by the organization and when outcome favorability was low. This 
finding was interesting given that one would not assume a fit situation (presumably a fair 
process) to result in lowest perceptions of distributive and interactional justice. However, 
it is also reasonable to expect recipients’ to be most frustrated when they expect a fair 
process and presumably favorable outcomes (i.e., fit) but receive unfavorable outcomes. 
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To sum up, the findings in this study clearly suggest that recipients have 
differential allocation norm preferences for different types of resources, namely 
resources that are allocated as an input to one’s work and resources that are allocated as 
a consequence of one’s work. Organizations are usually perceived as equity oriented 
systems where most of the allocations are based on the principle of each according to 
his/her inputs. The findings reported here, however, suggest that recipients of allocations 
may not always prefer these types of allocations. More importantly, this research sheds 
light on some of the factors that influence recipients to make the switch from preferring 
the equity norm to preferring other allocation norms (equality and need). 
Contributions to the Literature 
The current study adds to the existing body of research on allocation norms in 
several ways. First, this study represents an attempt to advance the research on allocation 
norms by taking the perspective of the recipient in the allocation situation. Most of the 
extant research on allocation norms has taken the perspective of the allocator, i.e., 
decision-makers, in the allocation situations and this has resulted in a one-sided view of 
a much bigger phenomena. Recipients in allocation situations are one of the major 
parties involved and incorporating their perspective will lead to a more complete 
understanding of allocation situations in organizations. 
Another major contribution of this study is that it distinguishes between the 
different resource categories proposed by (Foa & Foa, 1975). Most of the studies in the 
allocation literature classified these resources based on the original particularism-
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concreteness differentiation of the authors but have failed to find consistent results (e.g., 
Parks et al., 1996). This study suggested a two-way classification system for 
organizational resources: inputs and outcomes. The results showed that antecedents of a 
preferred allocation norm as well as consequences of the fit/misfit between a recipients’ 
preferred allocation norm and the allocation norm used by the organization differ by 
resource type. In other words, a one-size-fits approach does not really work in predicting 
recipients’ reactions to allocation decisions.  
In terms of methodology, the present study also contributes to the existing 
research in a significant way. Most of the studies conducted in the allocation literature 
have relied on laboratory studies and even those few studies that have employed field 
settings have utilized scenario-based designs. In contrast, the methodology used in this 
study allowed me to assess the perceptions and reactions of recipients about actual 
allocation situations. Moreover, by using a research design that used three surveys at 
three time periods, I was able to overcome most of the problems (i.e., common methods 
bias) associated with survey research. 
Managerial Implications 
The results of this study offer some practical implications. First, results 
demonstrated that both the fit and the misfit between what allocation norm a recipient 
prefers in an allocation situation and what norm the organization uses have important 
implications on recipients’ attitudes and behaviors toward the organization. Although a 
fit between these two have been shown to lead to more positive attitudes and behaviors, 
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from a managerial standpoint, it is obvious that this may not always be the case. In other 
words, managers are more than likely to encounter situations where their choice of an 
allocation norm will not be preferred by the recipient of the allocation. The results of this 
study showed two important things about these situations. First, managers need to be 
aware that not all types of misfit will elicit the same reactions from the recipients. 
Second, even tough a recipient does not prefer a certain allocation norm used by the 
organization, the negative reactions that arise from this misfit may be lessened by more 
favorable outcomes. In other words, recipients may still react positively to an allocation 
(or at least less negatively) when they think the result of the allocation is favorable for 
them, even tough the organization did not use their preferred allocation norm for that 
allocation. 
Another important managerial implication of this study is the finding that 
environmental factors are more influential in predicting a recipient’s allocation norm 
preference than his/her individual differences. Given that changing individual difference 
variables are usually beyond a manager’s capabilities, a manager can try to align a 
recipient’s preference for an allocation norm with the norm used by the organization by 
trying to influence the environmental factors that are present in the workplace.  
Limitations and Future Research 
As with any other research, this study also has several limitations. First, some of 
the measures were less than ideal. For instance, performance was measured based on a 
self-report scale. It was not possible to have objective measures of performance with this 
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sample because of participant anonymity but future research should use better measures 
of performance. Furthermore, although all the measures used in the study were 
established measures, the Turkish-translated versions were used for the first time in this 
study. Despite that the translations were done with utmost care and several Turkish 
native speakers proof-read the questionnaires before administration, the fact that these 
Turkish scales were not validated is a major limitation for this study.  
Another limitation of this research, and related to the first one, is the nature of its 
sample. The sample for this study consists of Turkish registered nurses. Although no 
differences are expected between a North-American sample and a Turkish sample in 
terms of the results, it may be a little harder to generalize these results to other 
professions. Nursing profession, by its nature, has its own norms and culture and the 
results observed in this study may be only generalizable to professions with such strong 
norms and culture. Future research should replicate this study with other professional 
samples.  
Third, although the total sample size of the study was adequate, usable data to 
look at different fit and misfit categories was very limited. Some of the categories had 
fewer than eight cases, which led to insignificant results due to lack of statistical power. 
Future research should design laboratory experiments where recipients’ allocation norm 
preferences are manipulated to where there is enough valid data in each fit and misfit 
category. 
One other important future research idea that stemmed from this study is the 
further categorization of the resource types (Foa & Foa, 1975). Results of this study 
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indicated that respondents viewed friendship/affiliation category as distinct from all the 
other resource types. Future research should try to understand why these type of 
resources are unique from other types. 
Finally, the model presented here may have left out important factors that affect 
recipient allocation preferences and their reactions to allocation decisions. Future 
research should examine different contextual factors and their influence on recipient 
allocation preferences. Likewise, the model presented and tested here only looked at five 
dependent variables, distributive, procedural, interactional justice, outcome satisfaction 
and performance and the effects of a fit/misfit between a recipient’s preferred allocation 
norm and the perceived allocation norm used by the organization are likely to affect 
more than just these five dependent variables. Future research should examine other 
potentially relevant dependent variables such as organizational commitment.  
Conclusion 
By building on extant theoretical and empirical literature, this study contributes 
to our understanding of antecedents of recipients’ allocation norm preferences and the 
effects of the interplay between a recipient’s preferred allocation norm and the norm 
used by the organization on several organizational outcomes. This study is the first to 
offer a big picture approach to recipient allocation preferences and how recipients feel 
about their organization’s allocation norm choices in a field setting. Despite its 
limitations, this study adds to the literature on allocation norms and organizational 
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justice by taking the perspective of the recipients and by examining both the antecedents 
and consequences of allocation norms in a single, theory-driven model. 
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Dear X employee, 
 
X University has agreed to participate in an important research project sponsored by 
Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. We request your individual assistance 
in this study by completing the attached survey and two other surveys in the following 
two weeks. 
 
The purpose of this survey is to investigate how individuals perceive allocation 
decisions at their organizations. Each survey (there are a total of three) should take 
about 15 minutes to complete. This research has been reviewed by the Institutional 
Review Board-Human Subjects in Research, Texas A&M University. As such, we are 
required to note that the risks associated with this study are minimal and there are no 
personal benefits (i.e., compensation) from participation in this study. The survey is 
entirely voluntary; there will be no penalty if you choose not to participate. However, it is 
critical for the success of the study that we receive a high response rate, so we would 
greatly appreciate your participation!  
 
Your responses to this survey will be kept completely anonymous. We will never 
identify you as a participant in this study, nor will we share your individual 
responses with anyone inside or outside of X University. When you have completed the 
survey, please enclose it in the provided envelope. You may then drop the envelope 
into the return mail box located at your break room within the next 3 days. After the 
surveys are returned to the primary researchers, they will be stored in a secure place. 
We will make available to your hospital management team an executive summary of the 
findings and implications after the data are processed and analyzed. The report will not 
include any information that will allow anyone to identify any individual responses. After 
that, the hard copies of the data will be shredded and recycled.  
 
You many contact either one of the researchers with questions you may have about this 
study. For questions regarding subjects’ rights you can contact the Institutional Review 
Board through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of Vice 
President for Research at (979)845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu. 
 
By answering the questions on this survey, I consent to participate in the study. 
 
Thank you very much! 
 
Prof. Dr. Adrienne Colella 
Mays Business School 
Texas A&M University 
4221 TAMU 77843-4221 
acolella@mays.tamu.edu 
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Please fill the blanks below so that we can match the three surveys you will complete 
for our project. This information is requested solely to match the three surveys you will 
complete throughout this project. In no means will it be used to identify you. 
 
Your mother’s maiden name   ________ 
 
Last four digits of your phone number ________ 
 
Your favorite color    ________ 
 
 
Instructions:  
 
Please circle (with pen or pencil) directly on this form, the number that best represents 
your agreement with the statement(s) provided. You will be asked to indicate your level 
of agreement or to determine which statement most accurately describes your 
perceptions. Multiple options will be provided from which you should choose only one 
(1) answer. Be sure to read the introduction to each new section to ensure you interpret 
and answer the questions correctly. Please note that there are no correct answers to 
these questions. A sample question is provided below:  
 
EXAMPLE:  
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement. 
Please refer to the table below for your answers. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
SOMEHWAT 
DISAGREE 
 
COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
1. I keep my belongings clean and neat. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Please read the questions carefully. Please do not skip any questions. 
 
Please do not discuss the questions and/or your answers with your coworkers. Please 
be honest with your answers. 
 
 
The questionnaire begins on the next page. Thank you!  
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Please refer to the table 
below when answering the questions. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
SOMEHWAT 
DISAGREE 
 
COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
1. I try to be courteous to everyone I meet. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I often get into arguments with my family and co-workers. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Some people think I’m selfish and egotistical. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I would rather cooperate with others than compete with them. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I tend to be cynical and skeptical of others’ intentions. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I believe that most people will take advantage of you if you let 
them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Most people I know like me. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Some people think of me as cold and calculating. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I am hard-headed and tough-minded in my attitudes. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. I generally try to be thoughtful and considerate. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. If I don’t like people, I let them know it. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. If necessary, I am willing to manipulate people to get what I 
want. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. I have confidence in my ability to perform my role. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. There are some tasks required by my role that I cannot do 
well. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. When my performance is poor, it is due to my lack of ability. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I doubt my ability to perform my role. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. I have all the skills needed to perform my role very well. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Most people who complete this job can perform this role 
better than I can. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I am an expert at my role. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. My future in this hospital is limited because of my lack of 
skills. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. I am very proud of my skills and abilities as it relates to this 
job. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. I feel threatened when others watch me work at this task. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Please refer to the table 
below when answering the questions. 
 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
NEUTRAL SOMEHWAT 
DISAGREE 
COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
23.  My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those 
around me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Winning is everything. 1 2 3 4 5 
25. I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. It annoys me when other people perform better than I do. 1 2 3 4 5 
27. It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group. 1 2 3 4 5 
28. It is important to me that I do my job better than others. 1 2 3 4 5 
29. I like sharing little things with my neighbors. 1 2 3 4 5 
30. The well-being of my co-workers is important to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
31. Competition is the law of nature. 1 2 3 4 5 
32. If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud.  1 2 3 4 5 
33. Being a unique individual is important to me. 1 2 3 4 5 
34. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and 
aroused. 
1 2 3 4 5 
35. I often do “my own thing”. 1 2 3 4 5 
36. It is important to me that I respect decisions made by my 
groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 
37. I rather depend on myself than on others.  1 2 3 4 5 
38. Family members should stick together, no matter what 
sacrifices are required. 
1 2 3 4 5 
39. Parents and children must stay together, as much as 
possible. 
1 2 3 4 5 
40. My personal identity independent from others is very 
important to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
41. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to 
sacrifice what I want. 
1 2 3 4 5 
42. My personal identity is very important to me.  1 2 3 4 5 
43. I am a unique person, separate from others.  1 2 3 4 5 
44. I respect the majority’s wishes in groups of which I am a 
member. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. Please refer to the table 
below when answering the questions. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
SOMEHWAT 
DISAGREE 
 
COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
45. I enjoy being unique and different from others.  1 2 3 4 5 
46. It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas 
before making a decision.  
1 2 3 4 5 
47. If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my 
means.  
1 2 3 4 5 
48. Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society.  1 2 3 4 5 
49. One should live one’s life independently of others. 1 2 3 4 5 
50. I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family 
did not approve of it.  
1 2 3 4 5 
51. I feel good when I cooperate with others.  1 2 3 4 5 
52. I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others. 1 2 3 4 5 
53. I prefer to be direct and forthright when I talk with people. 1 2 3 4 5 
54. Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure. 1 2 3 4 5 
55. To me, pleasure is spending time with others. 1 2 3 4 5 
56. Success is the most important thing in life. 1 2 3 4 5 
57. When I succeed, it is usually because of my abilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
58. I hate to disagree with others in my group. 1 2 3 4 5 
59. I would do what would please my family, even if I detested 
that activity.  
1 2 3 4 5 
60. I am dependent on my coworkers and supervisors for 
resources that are critical for my work.  
1 2 3 4 5 
61. I am dependent on my coworkers and supervisors for 
resources for which there is no alternative supply. 
1 2 3 4 5 
62. My coworkers and supervisors are dependent on me for 
resources that are critical for their work.  
1 2 3 4 5 
63. My coworkers and supervisors are dependent on me for 
resources for which there is no alternative supply. 
1 2 3 4 5 
64. I cannot accomplish my tasks without information or 
materials from my coworkers.  
1 2 3 4 5 
65. My coworkers depend on me for information or materials 
needed to perform their tasks. 
1 2 3 4 5 
66. Jobs performed by my coworkers are related to one 
another.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please indicate the extent to which the following work values are important to 
you. Please refer to the table below when answering the questions. 
 
 
NOT 
IMPORTANT 
AT ALL 
 
SOMEWHAT 
NOT 
IMPORTANT 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
SOMEHWAT 
IMPORTANT  
 
EXTREMELY 
IMPORTANT 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
67. Trying to avoid hurting other people 1 2 3 4 5 
68. Encouraging someone who is having a difficult day 1 2 3 4 5 
69. Trying to help a fellow worker through a difficult time 1 2 3 4 5 
70. Trying to help reduce a friend’s burden 1 2 3 4 5 
71. Helping others on difficult jobs 1 2 3 4 5 
72. Offering help to others when they are having a tough time 1 2 3 4 5 
73. Helping those who are worried about things at work 1 2 3 4 5 
74. Trying to be helpful to a friend at work 1 2 3 4 5 
75. Trying not to hurt a friend’s feelings 1 2 3 4 5 
76. Sharing information and ideas which others need to do their 
job 
1 2 3 4 5 
77. Correcting others’ errors without embarrassing them 1 2 3 4 5 
78. Lending a helping hand to someone having difficulty 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Each organization has its own goals. Please indicate the extent to which you 
think the following goals are emphasized and important at your organization.  
 
79. Quality 1 2 3 4 5 
80. Productivity 1 2 3 4 5 
81. Profit 1 2 3 4 5 
82. Sales 1 2 3 4 5 
83. Efficiency 1 2 3 4 5 
84. Competitiveness 1 2 3 4 5 
85. Management-employee relations 1 2 3 4 5 
86. Employee satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5 
87. Decision making participation 1 2 3 4 5 
88. Quality of work life 1 2 3 4 5 
89. Employee development and growth  1 2 3 4 5 
90. Warm and friendly atmosphere  1 2 3 4 5 
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Lastly, we would like you to answer some demographic questions.  
 
 
91. Your age 
 
_________________________________ 
 
92. Gender 
 
□ Female           □ Male 
 
93. How long have you been in the nursing 
profession? 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
94. How long have you been working at 
this organization? 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
95. What is your education level? (Please 
mark only the highest one) 
 
 
□ High School      □ College (2 years) 
 
□ College (4 years)   □ Other _______ 
 
96. What is your current position? 
 
□ Supervisor (ward)      □ Supervisor (block) 
 
□ Nurse (ward)       □ Nurse (office) 
 
□ Other _____________ 
 
97. What are your working hours?  
 
□ Day (8-17)    □ Shift (8-16, 16-24, 24-8) 
 
□ Other ______________ 
 
98. What is your employment status?  
 
 
□ Permanent           □ Contracted  
 
99. What department do you work in? (e.g., 
internal medicine, pediatrics, 
psychiatry, vb.) 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
100. Please mark your marital status. 
 
□ Married         □ Single        □ Widowed 
 
□ Other_______________ 
 
101. How many dependents do you have? 
 
_________________________________ 
 
102. Do you live in company-owned 
housing? 
 
□ Yes          □ No 
 
103. Do you live in the city? 
 
□ Yes         □ No 
 
104. What is your monthly income? (please 
mark one) 
 
□ 600 - 699 YTL      □ 700 - 799 YTL 
 □ 800 – 899 YTL     □ more than 900 YTL 
 
You participation is very valuable for us. Thank you very much.  
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Dear X employee, 
 
As we have mentioned before, X University has agreed to participate in an important 
research project sponsored by Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. We 
requested your individual assistance in this study by completing three surveys. We fully 
appreciate your participation in the first survey and thank you.  
 
The following is the second survey in this project. Again, your responses to this survey 
will be kept completely anonymous. We will never identify you as a participant in this 
study, nor will we share your individual responses with anyone inside or outside of X 
University. When you have completed the survey, please enclose it in the envelope 
provided. 
 
You many contact either one of the researchers with questions you may have about this 
study. For questions regarding subjects’ rights you can contact the Institutional Review 
Board through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of Vice 
President for Research at (979)845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu. 
 
Thank you very much! 
 
Adrienne Colella 
Mays Business School 
Texas A&M University 
4221 TAMU 77843-4221 
acolella@mays.tamu.edu 
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Please fill the blanks below so that we can match the three surveys you will complete 
for our project. This information is requested solely to match the three surveys you will 
complete throughout this project. In no means will it be used to identify you. 
 
Your mother’s maiden name   ________ 
 
Last four digits of your phone number ________ 
 
Your favorite color    ________ 
 
 
Instructions:  
 
Please circle (with pen or pencil) directly on this form, the number that best represents 
your agreement with the statement(s) provided. You will be asked to indicate your level 
of agreement or to determine which statement most accurately describes your 
perceptions. Multiple options will be provided from which you should choose only one 
(1) answer. Be sure to read the introduction to each new section to ensure you interpret 
and answer the questions correctly. Please note that there are no correct answers to 
these questions. A sample question is provided below:  
 
EXAMPLE:  
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement. 
Please refer to the table below for your answers. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
SOMEHWAT 
DISAGREE 
 
COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
2. I keep my belongings clean and neat. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Please read the questions carefully.  
 
Please do not skip any questions. 
 
Please do not discuss the questions and/or your answers with your coworkers. 
 
 
The questionnaire begins on the next page. Thank you!  
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There are a variety of resources used in organizations. Some of the resources allocated 
in organizations serve as an input to an employee’s work (e.g. office space, computers, 
access to market data) and yet some other organizational outcomes are given to 
employees as a consequence of their work (e.g. stock options, bonus, status). In a 
sense, the latter category represents the “outcomes” organizations allocate to their 
employees and the former one represents the “inputs”. Based on this distinction, please 
indicate whether you perceive the following resources as an input or an outcome by 
using the table below. 
 
 
THIS RESOURCE IS AN INPUT 
 
THIS RESOURCE IS AN OUTCOME 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
1. Affiliation refers to an expression of affectionate regard, warmth or 
comfort. An example of an affiliation resource would be whether your 
supervisors spend time listening to your personal problems and 
concerns.  
 
1 
 
2 
2. Status refers to an expression of evaluative judgment that conveys 
high or low prestige, regard, or esteem. An example of a status 
resource would be being invited to a party organized by the 
administration or receiving an award.  
 
1 
 
2 
3. Information refers to advice, opinions, instruction, or enlightenment 
and excludes those behaviors that can be classified as affiliation or 
status. An example of information would be having access to patient 
records and files. 
 
1 
 
2 
4. Money refers to any coin, currency, or token that has some standard 
unit of exchange value. An example of money would be your salary or 
pay raises.  
 
1 
 
2 
5. Goods refer to tangible products, objects or materials. An example of 
a good would be the uniforms you wear for work or the equipment you 
use for your work such as thermometers and blood pressure 
machines. 
 
1 
 
2 
6. Service refers to activities on the body or belongings of a person that 
often constitute labor for another. An example of service would be 
cleaning of your offices or availability of food during your shifts. 
 
1 
 
2 
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Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this 
page. 
 
Some of the resources allocated in organizations serve as an input to an employee’s 
work (e.g. office space, computers, access to market data). In a sense, these comprise 
the resources employees need to conduct their work.  
 
7. Below, there are three methods of allocating inputs in organizations. Please indicate 
how you prefer inputs to be allocated at X by ranking them from 1 (most often used) 
to 3 (least often used). 
       Equity, i.e., based on each individual’s performance   _________ 
       Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same                          _________ 
       Need, based on each individual’s need                       _________ 
 
Based on the above definition, please answer the following questions referring to 
the table. 
 
 
I DON’T 
PREFER THIS 
RULE AT ALL 
 
I DON’T 
PREFER THIS 
RULE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
I PREFER THIS 
RULE 
 
I STRONGLY 
PREFER THIS 
RULE  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
8. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer inputs to be 
allocated based on each individual’s performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer inputs to be 
allocated equally, i.e., everyone gets the same. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer inputs to be 
allocated based on each individual’s need. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please answer the following question referring to the table below. 
 
 
VERY SCARCE 
 
SCARCE 
 
NEITHER 
SCARCE NOR 
ABUNDANT 
 
ABUNDANT 
 
VERY 
ABUNDANT  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
11. Please indicate the extent to which you think inputs at X 
are scarce. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this 
page. 
 
Some of the resources allocated in organizations are given to employees as a 
consequence of their work (e.g. stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, these 
represent the “outcomes” organizations allocate to their employees. 
 
12. Below, there are three methods of allocating outcomes in organizations. Please 
indicate how you prefer inputs to be allocated at X by ranking them from 1 (most 
often used) to 3 (least often used). 
       Equity, i.e., based on each individual’s performance   _________ 
       Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same                          _________ 
       Need, based on each individual’s need                       _________ 
 
Based on the above definition, please answer the following questions referring to 
the table. 
 
I DON’T 
PREFER THIS 
RULE AT ALL 
 
I DON’T 
PREFER THIS 
RULE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
I PREFER THIS 
RULE 
 
I STRONGLY 
PREFER THIS 
RULE  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
13. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer outcomes to 
be allocated based on each individual’s performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer outcomes to 
be allocated equally, i.e., everyone gets the same. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Please indicate the extent to which you prefer outcomes to 
be allocated based on each individual’s need. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Based on the above definition, please answer the following questions referring to 
the table. 
 
 
VERY SCARCE 
 
SCARCE 
 
NEITHER 
SCARCE NOR 
ABUNDANT 
 
ABUNDANT 
 
VERY 
ABUNDANT  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
16. Please indicate the extent to which you think outcomes at 
X are scarce. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX C 
EXAMPLE SURVEY III INSTRUMENT FOR EMPLOYEES
 122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear X employee, 
 
As we have mentioned in our previous surveys, X University has agreed to participate in 
an important research project sponsored by Mays Business School at Texas A&M 
University. We requested your individual assistance in this study by completing three 
surveys. We fully appreciate your participation in the first and the second survey and 
thank you.  
 
The following is the third and the last survey in this project. Again, your responses to 
this survey will be kept completely anonymous. We will never identify you as a 
participant in this study, nor will we share your individual responses with anyone 
inside or outside of X University. When you have completed the survey, please enclose 
it in the envelope provided. 
 
You many contact either one of the researchers with questions you may have about this 
study. For questions regarding subjects’ rights you can contact the Institutional Review 
Board through Dr. Michael W. Buckley, Director of Research Compliance, Office of Vice 
President for Research at (979)845-8585 or mwbuckley@tamu.edu. 
 
Thank you very much! 
 
Adrienne Colella 
Mays Business School 
Texas A&M University 
4221 TAMU 77843-4221 
acolella@mays.tamu.edu 
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Please fill the blanks below so that we can match the three surveys you will complete 
for our project. This information is requested solely to match the three surveys you will 
complete throughout this project. In no means will it be used to identify you. 
 
Your mother’s maiden name   ________ 
 
Last four digits of your phone number ________ 
 
Your favorite color    ________ 
 
 
Instructions:  
 
Please circle (with pen or pencil) directly on this form, the number that best represents 
your agreement with the statement(s) provided. You will be asked to indicate your level 
of agreement or to determine which statement most accurately describes your 
perceptions. Multiple options will be provided from which you should choose only one 
(1) answer. Be sure to read the introduction to each new section to ensure you interpret 
and answer the questions correctly. Please note that there are no correct answers to 
these questions. A sample question is provided below:  
 
EXAMPLE:  
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement. Please 
refer to the table below for your answers. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
SOMEHWAT 
DISAGREE 
 
COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
3. I keep my belongings clean and neat. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Please read the questions carefully.  
 
Please do not skip any questions. 
 
Please do not discuss the questions and/or your answers with your coworkers. 
 
 
The questionnaire begins on the next page. Thank you!  
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Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this 
page. 
 
Some of the resources allocated in organizations serve as an input to an employee’s 
work (e.g. office space, computers, access to market data). In a sense, these comprise 
the resources employees need to conduct their work.  
 
1. Below, there are three methods of allocating inputs in organizations. Please indicate 
how inputs are allocated at X by ranking them from 1 (most often used) to 3 (least 
often used). 
       Equity, i.e., based on each individual’s performance   _________ 
       Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same                          _________ 
       Need, based on each individual’s need                       _________ 
 
2. Below, there are three methods of allocating inputs in organizations. Please rank 
these methods as the allocation of inputs according to these will give you the best 
allocation for your self-interest from 1 (the best allocation) to 3 (the worst allocation). 
       Equity, i.e., based on each individual’s performance   _________ 
       Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same                          _________ 
       Need, based on each individual’s need                       _________ 
 
Based on the above definition, please answer the following questions referring to 
the table. 
 
 
TO A VERY 
SMALL EXTENT 
 
TO A SMALL 
EXTENT 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TO A LARGE 
EXTENT 
 
TO A VERY 
LARGE EXTENT 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
3. Please indicate the extent to which you think inputs are 
allocated based on each individual’s performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Please indicate the extent to which you think inputs are 
allocated equally, i.e., everyone gets the same. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Please indicate the extent to which you think inputs are 
allocated based on each individual’s need. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this 
page. 
 
Some of the resources allocated in organizations serve as an input to an employee’s 
work (e.g. office space, computers, access to market data). In a sense, these comprise 
the resources employees need to conduct their work.  
 
Please answer the following two questions in reference to the inputs you receive 
from X. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
SOMEHWAT 
DISAGREE 
 
COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6. I am very satisfied with the inputs I receive from X. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Inputs I receive from X are very favorable. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Inputs I receive from X are much better than I expect. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. The inputs I am currently receiving are satisfactory. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. I am satisfied with my inputs. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please answer the following questions in reference to the inputs you receive 
from X.  
 
 
TO A VERY 
SMALL EXTENT 
 
TO A SMALL 
EXTENT 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TO A LARGE 
EXTENT 
 
TO A VERY 
LARGE EXTENT 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
11. Do the inputs you receive from X reflect the effort you have 
put in your work? 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Are your inputs appropriate for the work you have 
completed? 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Do your inputs reflect what you contribute to X? 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Are your inputs justified, given your performance? 1 2 3 4 5 
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Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this 
page. 
 
Some of the resources allocated in organizations serve as an input to an employee’s 
work (e.g. office space, computers, access to market data). In a sense, these comprise 
the resources employees need to conduct their work.  
 
Please answer the following questions in reference to the procedures used for 
allocating inputs at X. 
 
 
TO A VERY 
SMALL EXTENT 
 
TO A SMALL 
EXTENT 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TO A LARGE 
EXTENT 
 
TO A VERY 
LARGE EXTENT 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
15. Have you been able to express your views and feelings 
during the procedures? 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Have you had influence over the outcomes arrived at by 
those procedures? 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Have those procedures been applied consistently? 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Have those procedures been free of bias? 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Have those procedures been based on accurate 
information? 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Have you been able to appeal the outcomes arrived by 
those procedures? 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral 
standards? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please answer the following question in reference to those who allocate inputs 
at X. 
 
22. Has she treated you in a polite manner? 1 2 3 4 5 
23. Has she treated you with dignity? 1 2 3 4 5 
24. Has she treated you with respect? 1 2 3 4 5 
25. Has she refrained from improper remarks and comments? 1 2 3 4 5 
26. Has she been candid in her communications with you? 1 2 3 4 5 
27. Has she explained the procedures thoroughly? 1 2 3 4 5 
28. Were her explanations regarding the procedures 
reasonable? 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. Has she communicated details in a timely manner? 1 2 3 4 5 
30. Has she seemed to tailor her communications to 
individuals’ specific needs? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this 
page. 
 
Some of the resources allocated in organizations are given to employees as a 
consequence of their work (e.g. stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, these 
represent the “outcomes” organizations allocate to their employees. 
 
31. Below, there are three methods of allocating outcomes in organizations. Please 
indicate how outcomes are allocated at X by ranking them from 1 (most often used) 
to 3 (least often used). 
       Equity, i.e., based on each individual’s performance   _________ 
       Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same                          _________ 
       Need, based on each individual’s need                       _________ 
 
32. Below, there are three methods of allocating outcomes in organizations. Please rank 
these methods as the allocation of outcomes according to these will give you the 
best allocation for your self-interest from 1 (the best allocation) to 3 (the worst 
allocation). 
       Equity, i.e., based on each individual’s performance   _________ 
       Equality, i.e., everyone gets the same                          _________ 
       Need, based on each individual’s need                       _________ 
 
Based on the above definition, please answer the following questions referring to 
the table. 
 
 
TO A VERY 
SMALL EXTENT 
 
TO A SMALL 
EXTENT 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TO A LARGE 
EXTENT 
 
TO A VERY 
LARGE EXTENT 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
33. Please indicate the extent to which you think outcomes 
are allocated based on each individual’s performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
34. Please indicate the extent to which you think outcomes 
are allocated equally, i.e., everyone gets the same. 
1 2 3 4 5 
35. Please indicate the extent to which you think outcomes 
are allocated based on each individual’s need. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this 
page. 
 
Some of the resources allocated in organizations are given to employees as a 
consequence of their work (e.g. stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, these 
represent the “outcomes” organizations allocate to their employees. 
 
Please answer the following two questions in reference to the outcomes you 
receive from X. 
 
 
COMPLETELY 
AGREE 
 
SOMEWHAT 
AGREE 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
SOMEHWAT 
DISAGREE 
 
COMPLETELY 
DISAGREE 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
36. I am very satisfied with the outcomes I receive from X. 1 2 3 4 5 
37. Outcomes I receive from X are very favorable. 1 2 3 4 5 
38. Outcomes I receive from X are much better than I expect. 1 2 3 4 5 
39. The outcome I am currently receiving is satisfactory. 1 2 3 4 5 
40. I am satisfied with my outcome. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please answer the following questions in reference to the outcomes you receive 
from X.  
 
 
TO A VERY 
SMALL EXTENT 
 
TO A SMALL 
EXTENT 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TO A LARGE 
EXTENT 
 
TO A VERY 
LARGE EXTENT 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
41. Do the outcomes you receive from X reflect the effort you 
have put in your work? 
1 2 3 4 5 
42. Are your outcomes appropriate for the work you have 
completed? 
1 2 3 4 5 
43. Do your outcomes reflect what you contribute to X? 1 2 3 4 5 
44. Are your outcomes justified, given your performance? 1 2 3 4 5 
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Please refer to the description in the box when answering the questions on this 
page. 
 
Some of the resources allocated in organizations are given to employees as a 
consequence of their work (e.g. stock options, bonus, status). In a sense, these 
represent the “outcomes” organizations allocate to their employees. 
 
Please answer the following questions in reference to the procedures used for 
allocating outcomes at X. 
 
 
TO A VERY 
SMALL EXTENT 
 
TO A SMALL 
EXTENT 
 
NEUTRAL 
 
TO A LARGE 
EXTENT 
 
TO A VERY 
LARGE EXTENT 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
45. Have you been able to express your views and feelings 
during the procedures? 
1 2 3 4 5 
46. Have you had influence over the outcomes arrived at by 
those procedures? 
1 2 3 4 5 
47. Have those procedures been applied consistently? 1 2 3 4 5 
48. Have those procedures been free of bias? 1 2 3 4 5 
49. Have those procedures been based on accurate 
information? 
1 2 3 4 5 
50. Have you been able to appeal the outcomes arrived by 
those procedures? 
1 2 3 4 5 
51. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral 
standards? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please answer the following question in reference to those who allocate inputs 
at X. 
 
52. Has she treated you in a polite manner? 1 2 3 4 5 
53. Has she treated you with dignity? 1 2 3 4 5 
54. Has she treated you with respect? 1 2 3 4 5 
55. Has she refrained from improper remarks and comments? 1 2 3 4 5 
56. Has she been candid in her communications with you? 1 2 3 4 5 
57. Has she explained the procedures thoroughly? 1 2 3 4 5 
58. Were her explanations regarding the procedures 
reasonable? 
1 2 3 4 5 
59. Has she communicated details in a timely manner? 1 2 3 4 5 
60. Has she seemed to tailor her communications to 
individuals’ specific needs? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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The items below refer to your perceptions of several different aspects of your 
performance at your job. Please indicate your performance along these 
dimensions. 
 
 
NEEDS MUCH 
IMPROVEMENT 
 
NEEDS SOME 
IMPROVEMENT 
 
SATISFACTORY 
 
GOOD 
 
EXCELLENT 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
61. Quantity of work output 1 2 3 4 5 
62. Quality of work output 1 2 3 4 5 
63. Accuracy of work 1 2 3 4 5 
64. Patient service provided 1 2 3 4 5 
65. Obtaining personal career goals 1 2 3 4 5 
66. Developing skills needed for my future career 1 2 3 4 5 
67. Making progress in my career 1 2 3 4 5 
68. Seeking out career opportunities 1 2 3 4 5 
69. Coming up with new ideas 1 2 3 4 5 
70. Working to implement new ideas 1 2 3 4 5 
71. Finding improved ways to do things 1 2 3 4 5 
72. Creating better processes and routines 1 2 3 4 5 
73. Working as part of a team or work group 1 2 3 4 5 
74. Seeking information from others in her work group 1 2 3 4 5 
75. Making sure her work group succeeds 1 2 3 4 5 
76. Responding to the needs of others in her work group 1 2 3 4 5 
77. Doing things that help others when it is not part of her job 1 2 3 4 5 
78. Working for the overall good of the company 1 2 3 4 5 
79. Doing things to promote the company 1 2 3 4 5 
80. Helping so that the company is a good place to be 1 2 3 4 5 
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